Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings: The Continuous Burdens Principle, and its Broader Application by Kades, Eric
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2002
Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings: The
Continuous Burdens Principle, and its Broader
Application
Eric Kades
William & Mary Law School, eakade@wm.edu
Copyright c 2002 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Kades, Eric, "Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings: The Continuous Burdens Principle, and its Broader Application" (2002).
Faculty Publications. Paper 51.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/51
HeinOnline -- 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 189 2002-2003
Copyright 2002 by Northwestern University School of Law 
Northwestern University Law Review 
Printed in U.S.A. 
Vol. 97, No. I 
DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN TAXES AND 
TAKINGS: THE CONTINUOUS BURDENS 
PRJNCIPLE, AND ITS BROADER APPLICATION 
Eric Kades• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When government taxes, it takes citizens' property, usually money, to 
fund various projects. The Takings Clause1 declares that the government 
must pay compensation when it takes private property. Requiring compen-
sation for taxation would immediately bankrupt the state, as the state would 
have to return immediately all tax receipts to meet this compensation duty. 
This simple argument shows that the Takings Clause cannot reach all taxes. 
This Article addresses one fundamental question: What forms of taxation, 
if any, constitute a "taking" and require compensation? To illustrate this 
question, consider the example posed by Calvin Massey: "Surely an in-
come tax of 100% imposed on a single individual-for example, Bill 
Gates-would violate the Takings Clause. If that is so, then the problem 
becomes a matter of degree."2 This example does not present a novel di-
lemma. An early critic of the income tax feared ever-increasing exemptions 
and marginal rates would concentrate the burden of income taxation on the 
wealthy few: 
"If you approve this law, with this iniquitous exemption of $4,000, and this 
communistic march goes on and five years hence a statute comes to you with 
an exemption of $20,000 and a tax of 20 percent ... how can you meet it in 
view of the decision which my opponents ask you now to render [upholding 
the income tax]?"3 
The "communistic march" of exempting ever-greater incomes and subject-
• B.A., Yale College, 1985; J.D., Yale Law School, 1994. Thanks to Lynda Butler, Bob Ellickson, 
Jim Krier, Glynn Lunney, Tom Merril, Ron Rosenberg, and participants at a Tulane Law School faculty 
workshop for helpful comments and suggestions. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation"). 
2 Calvin R. Massey, Takings and Progressive Rate Taxation, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 85, 104 
(1996). We will call this example the "Bill Gates Tax." 
3 ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX, 1861-1913, at 152 (1993) (quoting Joseph Choate, prominent opponent of progressive 
income tax in late 1800s). 
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ing the wealthy still taxed to ever-greater tax rates becomes our Bill Gates 
Tax. 
A tax singling out one or a handful of citizens offends the constitu-
tional principle the Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked: the Takings 
Clause is designed "to bar the Government from forcing some people alone 
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole."4 Thus, the notion that taxes are never takings is in-
consistent with foundational takings law; the label "tax" confers no immu-
nity to the principles of the Takings Clause. 
Richard Epstein employs this insight with a vengeance. Under his 
fully articulated theory, the Takings Clause invalidates not just esoteric hy-
potheticals like the Bill Gates tax, but deems unconstitutional the income 
tax code's long-standing progressive rate structure.5 Higher rates on higher 
incomes, Epstein maintains, take the property of top earners to a dispropor-
tionate degree. According to Epstein, only strictly proportional rates (i.e., a 
"flat" tax) satisfy the demands of the Takings Clause.6 
Epstein's position is inconsistent with long-standing taxation practices 
in the United States. Yet, it is perhaps no more extreme than the view un-
dermined above, that taxes are never takings. Numerous critics have at-
tacked Epstein's position.7 No one, however, has offered a coherent theory 
of the relationship between taxes and takings; instead, one fits reality by 
simultaneously holding the "Bill Gate Tax" invalid but progressive income 
taxation and other common taxes valid. 
This Article proposes a novel rule to draw the line between permissible 
taxes and those that violate the Takings Clause: the Continuous Burden 
Principle (CBP). To satisfy the CBP, a tax must impose burdens such that 
4 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960). A tax on ''named individuals or [on] easily as-
certainable members of a group" might be unconstitutional on grounds entirely unrelated to the Takings 
Clause, as a bill of attainder, if it imposed ''punishment." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 
(1946) (discussing the Bill of Attainder Clauses, U.S. CONST, art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (barring Congress from pass-
ing bills of attainder); U.S. CONST. art. I, § I 0, cl. I (barring state legislatures from passing bills of attain-
der)). The Supreme Court has stated that "confiscation of property" is a form of punishment for purposes of 
the rule against bills of attainder. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,474 (1977). This Article 
does not further consider the possibility that taxation of one person or a small, identifiable group might 
amount to a bill of attainder. Note that many of the taxes that will be discussed do not identify individuals 
by name, or do not impact an "easily ascertainable" group of persons, and so would not implicate the bill of 
attainder clauses in any event. 
5 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 297-
300 (1985). 
6 Progressive income taxation is not the only commonly used tax Epstein finds inconsistent with the 
Takings Clause. His logic also implies that the widespread use of a property tax to fund education is a tak-
ing. See discussion infra Part V. 
7 See. e.g., Larry Alexander, Takings of Property and Constitutional Serendipity, 41 U. MIAMI L. 
REv. 223 (1986); William W. Fisher III, The Significance of Public Perceptions of the Takings Doctrine, 
88 COLUM. L. REv. 1774 (1988); Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 
21 (1986). 
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there are no large jumps--discontinuities, in an imprecise sense-between 
the burden imposed on any taxpayer and the next-most-burdened taxpayer.8 
The Article then generalizes the CBP and argues that it applies not just to 
all forms of taxation but to assessments, fees, zoning, the draft, pension ob-
ligations, and other forms of regulation that may amount to a taking. The 
CBP at its core is a novel definition of what it means for one or a few prop-
erty owners to be "singled out" for an unfair share of public burdens, which 
is the most frequently recited justification for the Takings Clause. 
Before presenting the CBP and its applications in Part IV, Parts II 
and III of this Article summarize existing commentary on the line between 
taxes and takings, show that there are no fundamental tensions between 
tax policy and takings policy, and consider the arguments of Epstein and 
others on the constitutionality of progressive income taxation. Part IV 
fully presents the CBP. Part V then considers the CBP's application to 
taxes and assessments where, unlike general revenue taxes, beneficiaries 
are easily identifiable. Finally, Part VI considers the difficult question of 
what group of measures should be "packaged" together for takings 
analysis. 
II. EXISTING COMMENTARY DISTINGUISHING TAXES FROM TAKINGS 
Perhaps the most surprising observation about recent commentary on 
drawing the line between taxation and takings is its paucity. This is surpris-
ing since the issue is so fundamental. The few scholars addressing the issue 
often stress the difficulty in demarcation. For instance, Walter Blum and 
Harry Kalven state that the difference between taxation and takings-
confiscation "is more troublesome to isolate than one would expect. If the 
element of coercion makes it easy to distinguish taxation from charity, the 
same element makes it awkward to distinguish the coercion of taxation 
from confiscation."9 In other words, Blum and Kalven find no guidance in 
a Constitution that simultaneously confers the power of taxation yet also 
contains the Takings Clause. Massey, writing on the constitutionality of 
8 We put to one side certain taxes that cannot violate the Takings Clause. Taxes used to discourage be-
havior that amounts to a nuisance are not takings; the Supreme Court has long declared and has recently 
affirmed that the government may completely ban such uses of property. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 
394, 410 (1915) (to extent brickwork constituted nuisance, locality could forbid use without owing compen-
sation); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022-23 (1992) (discussing power to regulate 
"harmful or noxious uses"); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 285. Similarly, the government may dis-
courage, through taxation, other behavior that is illegal, such as antitnJst violations. Note that taxes on nui-
sances and antitnJst violators impose relatively narrow burdens and so, without this exception, might 
qualify as compensable takings. If, however, the government has the power to eliminate an activity or regu-
late it extensively without paying compensation, it may use taxation as a regulatory tool. Deciding exactly 
what the government may regulate without paying compensation is a difficult question at the core of takings 
law; the simple point here is that if regulation is not a taking in a given context, then neither is a tax de-
signed to achieve the same ends. 
9 WALTERJ. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE ANATOMY OF JUSTICE IN TAXATION 4 (Univ. of Chi-
cago Law School, Occasional Papers, 1973). 
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progressive income taxation, likewise describes the "none-too-clear bound-
ary between taxation and taking."1° Few scholars have heeded Saul 
Levmore's exhortation that "every theory of takings should explain or at 
least struggle with the question of why the power to tax-without compen-
sation, of course-is not fundamentally inconsistent with the constitutional 
obligation to compensate condemnees."11 
At times, judges and legal commentators have declared that Congress' 
power to tax is beyond constitutional review. Almost two hundred years 
ago, for instance, Chief Justice Marshall famously declared that "[t]he only 
security against the abuse of [taxation] is found in the structure of the gov-
ernment itself. "12 The implication of Marshall's declaration is clear: those 
dissatisfied with a tax should elect representatives who will repeal the levy. 
Thomas Cooley, a leading jurist and scholar, echoed Chief Justice Marshall 
a hundred years later: "[T]he power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in 
force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare 
that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the 
discretion of the authority which exercises it."13 
Yet, this is the same Cooley cited at the beginning of this section for 
the conflicting proposition that a tax can amount to confiscation (a taking), 
in which case an injured property owner has a judicial remedy in addition to 
any political options. As shown in subpart II.B, the quotations in the previ-
ous paragraph do not accurately reflect the "classical" nineteenth-century 
view of the line between taxes and takings. Far from holding taxation im-
mune to the Takings Clause, and thus denying the need to draw a line be-
tween the two, case law repeatedly held that "unfairly apportioned" taxation 
could violate the Takings Clause. 
Before discussing this relatively sophisticated classical doctrine, which 
could determine when taxation shaded over into takings, this Article first 
discusses a much simpler rule: any measure that imposes a general obliga-
tion to make a payment is a tax, while a measure stripping an owner of a 
specific asset is a taking. Strangely, both the modem Supreme Court and 
many scholars have embraced this highly formal rule. The classical view, 
focusing much more on the substance of a tax instead of its form, arose 
during an era commonly perceived as a period of excessively formal legal 
analysis. 
10 Massey, supra note 2, at 86. 
11 Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REv. 285, 292 (1990). Levmore 
suggests that expenditures from tax revenues must provide roughly commensurate reciprocal benefits in 
order to avoid a takings claim. !d. 
12 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,428 (1819). 
13 STANLEY, supra note 3, at 82 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 479, 
487-88, 494 (Alexis C. Angell ed., 6th ed. 1890)). 
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A. A Simple Solution: Taxations General Liabilities 
Versus Takings Specific Assets 
The idea that taxes and takings can be distinguished, by defining taxes 
as general obligations and takings as deprivations of specific assets, is of 
very recent origin. Blum and Kalven apparently were the first to consider 
this distinction. 14 They realized the problems inherent in such a formal dis-
tinction: 
But [this rule] may on occasion fail to keep taxation and confiscation clearly 
apart. Taxes can be set so high that the taxpayer is forced to dispose of spe-
cific property or simply turn it over to government in order to satisfy his tax 
obligation. This perception is at the core of the notion of confiscatory taxa-
tion. Indeed, revolutionary regimes have sometimes used the format of 100 
percent taxation as the very vehicle of confiscation. 15 
Despite this manifest conceptual wealrness, and the lack of any prece-
dent even suggesting this view, it appears that the Supreme Court recently 
embraced the type of distinction proposed by Blum and Kalven. 
In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 16 the Court struck down a statute im-
posing between $50 million and $100 million of retroactive liability for 
workers' health problems on a corporation that exited the coal business 
decades before Congress enacted the statute imposing the liability. The 
Justices' voting pattern in Eastern Enterprises was messy. O'Connor, writ-
ing for a plurality of four, argued that the statute worked as a taking. Ken-
nedy, concurring with the result, refused to invoke the Takings Clause 
because the statute "does not operate upon or alter an identified property 
interest. The law simply imposes an obligation."17 Kennedy expanded on 
this theme at length and concluded that the Supreme Court had always 
"been careful not to lose sight of the importance of identifying the property 
allegedly taken."18 Kennedy, nonetheless, voted to hold the statute uncon-
stitutional because he believed that such extraordinary retroactivity violated 
the substantive dimension of the Due Process Clause. 
Breyer, in dissent with three other Justices, agreed with Kennedy that 
the Takings Clause applied only to "specific interests in physical or intellec-
tual property," as distinguished from the statute at issue in the case, which 
"involve[d] not an interest in physical or intellectual property, but an ordi-
nary liability to pay money."19 Breyer agreed with Kennedy that the proper 
doctrine to apply was substantive due process, but argued that the statute 
14 BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 9, at 4 (arguing that the difference between taxation and takings 
"appears to reside essentially in the difference between taking money and taking specific property"). 
15 !d. at 5. 
16 524 u.s. 498 (1998). 
17 !d. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). 
18 /d.at543 . 
19 /d. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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satisfied that test. Moreover, he strongly implied that taxes can never be 
takings: "If the Clause applies when the government simply orders A to 
pay B, why does it not apply when the government simply orders A to pay 
the government, i.e. when it assesses a tax."20 
Other than O'Connor's plurality opinion that applied the Takings 
Clause, the only "majority vote" to emerge was the combination of Ken-
nedy (concurring) and Breyer (dissenting, with three others) for the proposi-
tion that the Takings Clause applies only to deprivations of "identified 
property interests," or to "specific interests in physical or intellectual prop-
erty. "21 
Neither Kennedy nor Breyer offered any precedent or argument for this 
distinction. As Thomas Merrill notes, "[t]he Breyer/Kennedy argument as 
to why no takings property was implicated by the Coal Act [in Eastern En-
terprises] was a novel one, in the sense that neither Justice was able to cite 
any legal authority in support of his thesis."22 The only policy justification 
that Kennedy offered was, in effect, that takings doctrine is in such disarray 
that we need to limit its applicability as much as possible.23 This justifica-
tion is unconvincing, especially given that substantive due process is no 
model of doctrinal clarity. Breyer seemingly acknowledged the form-over-
substance nature of his grounds for distinguishing taxation from takings; he 
admitted that, economically, the statute in Eastern Enterprises is no differ-
ent from taking specific plants and equipment worth $50 million to $100 
million.24 
Form over substance is not the worst problem with the Breyer dissent. 
He goes on to quarrel with Justice O'Connor about the "character of the 
government action" arm of the Takings Clause test from Penn Central.25 In 
other words, Breyer's dissent demonstrates profound doctrinal confusion. 
If Breyer really believed that the Takings Clause did not apply to the facts 
of Eastern Enterprises, he should have chided O'Connor for invoking a 
Takings test instead of a substantive due process test. 
In the end, the distinction may not matter, as the substantive due proc-
ess test articulated by Kennedy and Breyer apparently differs little from the 
Penn Central Takings Clause test applied by O'Connor. The Court noted in 
20 !d. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As discussed infra Part 11.8, Breyer ignores a long line of cases 
that have held that taxes may amount to takings. 
21 !d. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
22 Thomas W. Menill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 903 (2000). 
MetTill, nonetheless, says that "the argument was presented as an inductive generalization drawn from the 
holdings of the Court's takings cases, and in this sense was not radical." /d. 
23 E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 541-42. Of course, the same might well be said about substantive due proc-
ess, and takings at least has the advantage of beginning the analysis under a label that is not an oxymoron. 
24 !d. at 529. 
25 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (articulating the following 
three part test in deciding takings claims: (i) economic impact on claimant; (ii) extent to which regula-
tion interferes with investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the governmental action). 
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previous pension cases, in which it applied the Takings Clause, that results 
were likely to be the same under either theory.26 It is not surprising, then, in 
Eastern that Justice O'Connor claimed that both her plurality 's Takings 
Clause analysis and the concurring and dissenting opinions' substantive 
Due Process Clause analysis drew on common principles.27 Even more tell-
ing, Kennedy cited O'Connor's analysis as a convincing means to reach his 
conclusion: "The plurality opinion demonstrates in convincing fashion that 
the remedy created by the Coal Act bears no legitimate relation to the inter-
ests which the Government asserts in support of the statute. "28 The "dem-
onstration" Kennedy cited with approval is O'Connor's application of the 
Penn Central takings test. Similarly, Justice Breyer directly applied the 
same Takings test in his dissent and then stated that substantive due process 
analysis is similar and merely "put[s] the matter more directly."29 In the 
end, then, the substantive due process analysis applied by Kennedy, in con-
currence, and Breyer, in dissent, is simply a thinly veiled reworking of tak-
ings law. 
The greatest strength of O'Connor's plurality opinion is that she fit the 
facts of the case under the primary purpose of the Takings Clause-
avoiding unfair allocation of the burdens of public projects.30 
"[T]he Constitution does not permit a solution to the problem of funding min-
ers' benefits that imposes such a disproportionate and severely retroactive bur-
den upon Eastern." While we do not question Congress ' power to address that 
problem, the solution it crafted improperly places a severe, disproportionate, 
and extremely retroactive burden on EastemY 
The legislature should not be able to defeat the primary substantive purpose 
of the Takings Clause, avoiding "disproportionate" burdens, by the formal-
ity of assessing a general liability instead of taking a specific asset. 
In a thorough and careful effort to arrange the Supreme Court's exist-
26 In Connolly, the Court declared that it was not surprising that a Takings claim failed where an earlier 
(substantive) due process claim had failed . Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986). 
There is similar language in Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pen-
sion Trust , 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (quoting Connolly). As O'Connor makes clear, the definitional distinction 
between takings and substantive due process is not based on remedy: although takings claims usually re-
quest damages ('just compensation'') and substantive due process claims usually request injunctive relief, 
the Court has held that takings plaintiffs may request injunctive and declaratory relief. E. Enters., 524 U.S. 
at 521 (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 71 n.I5 (1978)). Breyer 
apparently overlooked this passage in his dissent when he rhetorically asked, "could a court apply the same 
kind of Takings Clause analysis when violation means the law's invalidation, rather than simply the pay-
ment of compensation?" /d. at 556. 
27 E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 529. 
28 /d. at 549. 
29 /d. at 567. 
30 See infra Part Il.C (demonstrating that avoiding unfair burden allocation lies at the core of the Su-
preme Court's substantive analysis of takings claims). 
31 £ . Enters., 524 U.S. at 536-38. 
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ing body of constitutional property precedents-takings, substantive due 
process, and procedural due process-into some sort of coherent structure, 
Merrill is constrained to adhere to the holding of Apfel, despite this substan-
tive ground for applying the Takings Clause. He found that the Supreme 
Court limits the Takings Clause to "discrete assets," which he defined as 
follows: 
[A] valued resource that ( 1) is held by the claimant in a legally recognized 
property (for example, a fee simple, a lease, an easement, and so forth), and (2) 
is created, exchanged or enforced by economic actors with enough frequency 
to be recognized as a distinct asset in the relevant community.32 
It is beyond the purpose of Merrill's article to offer any normative jus-
tification for the general-liability-specific-asset distinction. He did seem to 
find some merit, however, in a discrete-asset test, because it "would also 
eliminate the possibility of using the Takings Clause as an instrument for 
litigating issues of general distributive justice. "33 He found that this feature 
has the benefit of at least confining "the Takings Clause to its traditional 
orbit."34 According to Merrill, "The implicit understanding has always 
been that the Takings Clause has no application to legislation that imposes 
taxes or allocates government spending."35 Although Merrill's concept may 
square with more recent understandings of the Takings Clause, this is not 
the case as a matter of older tradition. As subpart II.B demonstrates, nine-
teenth-century courts and commentators repeatedly found that some taxes 
did, in fact, amount to takings. 
To date, only Blum and Kalven, the originators of the idea that taxa-
tion differed from takings by imposing a general liability, have offered 
any sort of policy justifications for such a distinction: "Perhaps ... the 
taking of specific property by the state is more intrusive than the crea-
tion of obligations to be satisfied in money ... perhaps it is suspected 
that the taking of property will be not systematic or disciplined by prin-
32 Menill, supra note 22, at 974. Merrill says the discrete asset requirement is closely bound up with 
the tight to exclude: "The discrete asset requirement tells us what it is the owner has a right to exclude oth-
ers from." !d. at 975. In forming a doctrinal scheme that squares with scattershot Supreme Court prece-
dents, he is then forced to maintain that a bank account is discrete property. !d. He must do so in order to 
avoid contradicting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies. Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (holding state 
retention of interest on litigants' funds held in escrow a taking), and Phillips v. Washington Legal Founda-
tion, 524 U.S. 1925 (1998) (holding use of interest from pooled small client trust accounts to fund legal ser-
vices for poor a taking). This highlights just how formal a system the Supreme Court has created, if 
Eastern Enterprises truly limits the Takings Clause to deprivations of specific assets. It is a taking to ex-
propriate a specific bank account, but not to impose a tax for precisely the amount in the account As 
argued in the main text, the latter may amount to a substantive due process violation for which the legal 
standard appears to be very similar to the takings test. Thus, in the end, one has a distinction without a 
difference. 
33 Merrill, supra note 22, at 980. 
34 !d. 
35 /d. 980-81. 
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ciple."36 However, Blum and Kalven's repeated use of "perhaps" com-
municates, at best, a half-hearted belief in the proffered merits of the 
distinction. 
The almost complete absence of a normative justification makes it 
difficult to plumb the attractiveness of the general-liability-discrete-
asset distinction. Perhaps the appeal stems from a mistaken analogy to a 
seemingly less controversial principle: that it is pointless for the gov-
ernment to take money by condemnation, because the Takings Clause 
requires its immediate return. Yet, even this simple statement requires 
qualification, as there are two ways to make sense of a taking of money. 
First, as Cooley noted, "[t]aking money under the right of eminent do-
main, when it must be compensated in money afterwards, could be noth-
ing more or less than a forced loan."37 In such a case, the government 
exploits the time required for the money's owner to seek compensation. 
The few authorities on point agree that such forced loans are 
only to be justified as a last resort in a time of extreme peril, where neither the 
credit of the government nor the power of taxation could be made available. It 
is impossible to lay down rules for such a case, except such as the law of over-
ruling necessity, which for the time being sets aside all the rules and protec-
tions of private right, shall then prescribe.38 
Given the government's undeniable power to define what assets consti-
tute legal tender,39 however, there is a second way in which the government 
can take money without delaying "compensation." Specifically, the gov-
ernment can: 
(i) declare government bonds (of any term, e.g., principal due in one 
year, ten years, thirty years, or even perpetual obligations) to be legal 
tender, 
(ii) condemn someone's money, and 
(iii) pay them with government bonds. 
36 BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 9, at 4-5. 
37 Cooley, supra note 13, at ch. XV, at 759 n.2. 
38 /d. at 759; see also Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419,424 (1851 )("The exigencies of a state 
government can seldom require the taking of money by virtue of this power even in time of war, and never 
in time of peace."). 
39 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 5 (declaring that Congress shall have the power "To coin Money, regulate 
the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin"). The key cases affirming the plenary nature of this power are (i) 
The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870) (upholding Congress's power to declare that treas-
ury notes shall be legal tender, even for debts predating the law making said notes legal tender); (ii) Nor-
man v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (upholding power of Congress to abrogate clauses in 
private contracts requiring payment in gold); and (iii) Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) (holding, 
somewhat confusingly, that although it was unconstitutional for the U.S. to repudiate a public promise to 
pay in gold, bond owners suffered no damages as they received the face amount of the bond in current legal 
tender). 
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Circulating as money, such bonds would likely trade at a discount to 
their face value (i.e., with the principal due at end of term) as the interest 
rate would be below market rates; otherwise, the government would have 
borrowed through the market for less. In practice, this may well not matter. 
Outside of those dire emergencies when authority suggests that the gov-
ernment may force loans without the redefinition of legal tender, it seems 
likely that voluntary transactions (e.g., selling bonds to the highest bidder) 
will be transactionally and administratively cheaper than forced sales under 
the condemnation power. 
Absent extraordinary circumstances that might induce the government 
to resort to forced loans or use of the legal tender power, however, it seems 
that the government has little incentive to take money under its condemna-
tion power. It is possible that in Eastern Enterprises Kennedy and Breyer 
thought that this lack of any incentive to take money stood for the much 
broader principle that "it is impossible to condemn money." There is no 
linkage between the futility of condemning money and the definition of a 
taking. The disincentives to taking money tells us nothing about what 
forms of taxation, if any, run afoul of the Takings Clause. 
B. More Nuanced Classical Vzews 
In contrast with the formalism of Eastern Enterprises, commentary 
from what I call the "classical" era, the late 1800s and early 1900s, con-
fronted the substantive similarity between taxes and takings. 
Everything that may be done under the name of taxation is not necessarily a 
tax; and it may happen that an oppressive burden imposed by the government, 
when it comes to be carefully scrutinized, will prove, instead of a tax, to be an 
unlawful confiscation of property, unwarranted by any principle of constitu-
tional government. 40 
This willingness to "carefully scrutinize" measures regardless of the 
categorical label used by the legislature stands in sharp contrast with East-
ern Enterprises, which distinguishes taxation and takings based on the for-
mal notion of fungibility. When the government requires citizens to part 
with fungible assets by imposing a general liability and taking money, it is 
taxation according to Eastern Enterprises. When the government requires a 
specific, nonfungible asset, however, it is deemed a taking. 
The "classical" nineteenth-century authority presented in this subsec-
tion, however, focuses on a different dimension: the relative size of the 
group from whom the government extracts wealth. The following table 
summarizes the interaction of this classical dimension with the Eastern En-
terprises dimension. 
4° COOLEY, supra note 13, at ch.l4, at697. 
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TABLE! 
Cash/General Monopoly Asset Liability 
(ultimate in (ultimate in non-
fungibility) fungibility) 
Few Owners' Bill Gates Tax, Property Taken Approaching Archetypal Taking (as% of 
population) Taking 
Many Owners' 
Property Taken Archetypal Tax l,>*i 
(as% of 
pop_ulatlonl I<< 
Taxes usually fall on a relatively large portion of the population, and 
usually require payment in fungible money. This is why the table uses the la-
bel "archetypal tax" in the lower left cell. The archetypal taking is the con-
demnation of a single piece of land, hence the label in the upper right cell. 
Both the fungibility standard from Eastern Enterprises and the relative 
group size of the classical standard correctly classify the archetypal cases. 
They diverge, however, in their classification of (i) a tax impacting a small 
group of citizens (the upper left cell) and (ii) the condemnation of non-
fungible assets of a large portion of the citizenry (the lower right cell). This 
last category, however, is largely empty: it is hard to imagine the govern-
ment condemning nonfungible assets en masse. Even in a large land as-
sembly project, such as the construction of a major highway, the 
government uses the land of a very small percentage of the population. The 
only exception appears to arise from the per se rule that permanent physical 
invasions are always takings. Thus, in Loretto v. Manhattan CATV Corp., 
the Supreme Court held that a municipal ordinance barring landlords from 
interfering with the installation and maintenance of cable TV wiring and 
junction boxes on their properties amounted to a taking.41 Given that the 
just compensation ultimately awarded in Loretto was trivial,42 and given 
that compensation will likely be trivial in similar cases, courts and com-
mentators can ignore the lower right cell. 
41 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
42 On remand, the New York Court of Appeals ratified the state legislature's determination that just 
compensation for suffering the presence of cable TV wiring and appliances amounted to a token $1. 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E. 428 (N.Y. 1983). 
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They cannot ignore the upper right cell, however, for it is easy to con-
ceive of general liabilities that impact a narrow band of the population. 
This Article discussed some dramatic hypothetical examples in the Intro-
duction, such as the Bill Gates tax, and will examine some actual examples 
in Parts ill, IV, and V. It is here that the fungibility and the "size of group" 
criteria part ways. The classic view suggests that, at some point, a narrowly 
focused tax becomes a taking; however, the discrete-asset model does not 
apply the Takings Clause to such a general liability. 
The remaining portion of Part II, along with Parts III and IV, argues 
that the classical test is normatively preferable. After laying out the classi-
cal position, I argue that such a position is much more congruent with both 
judicial and academic statements about the purpose of the Takings Clause. 
I then demonstrate that there is no inconsistency between the purposes of 
taxation and takings. The Continuous Burdens Principle (CBP) presented 
in Part IV can be understood as refining the crude many/few distinction of 
the classical model. 
1. Classical Theories Treated Takings and Taxation as Structurally 
Similar.-Far from seeing taxation and takings as polar opposites, nine-
teenth-century judges and commentators repeatedly noted their similarities. 
One antebellum judge honestly admitted "that it is by no means easy to trace 
the dividing line between the two kinds of taking private property,"43 and 
went on to observe that "the two appear in principle to be somewhat blended. 
Both are exercises of the sovereign power over individual property, and in 
both cases the individual is presumed to receive or does in fact receive some 
equivalent for the contribution."44 A contemporary concurred: 
The right of taxation and the right of eminent domain rest substantially on the 
same foundation. Compensation is made when private property is taken in ei-
ther way. Money is property. Taxation takes it for public use; and the tax-
payer receives, or is supposed to receive his just compensation in the 
protection which government affords to his life, liberty and property, and in 
the increase of the value of his possessions by the use to which the government 
applies the money raised by the tax. When private property is taken by right of 
eminent domain, special compensation is made. 45 
The principle articulated is straightforward. Government uses both 
taxation and condemnation to provide public goods. Both cases, under this 
classical view, involve a promise of recompense, in one form or another. 
For condemnation, the promise is explicit, as represented by the just com-
pensation requirement. For taxation, the promise is implicit: the govern-
ment will spend tax revenues on projects benefiting most if not all citizens, 
43 People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 6 Barb. 209,214 (N.Y. Ch. 1849). 
44 !d. 
45 Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419,422 (1851) (upholding special assessment for roads, with 
assessments based on frontage). 
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especially regarding the protection oflife, liberty, and property. 
A postbellum court extended this analysis to include special assess-
ments, under which a government charges landowners who particularly bene-
fit by some project, such as a widening of a road, for the costs of that project: 
The government may appropriate the property of the individual, when neces-
sary, in one of three ways: First, by taking in the mode prescribed after paying 
the owner for it; second, by estimating the benefits to the owner's property 
from the improvements to be made, and taking the amount estimated in 
money; third, by taking the property in the form of money by the methods of 
taxation for which the benefits of protection and other advantages are fur-
nished by the government. The same principle underlies all these methods. 
When the property is taken under the right of eminent domain, the public pays 
the owner in money; when money is exacted by means of a special assessment, 
the owners are compensated in special benefits to their property by public im-
provements made in its expenditure; and when money is exacted by a general 
tax the payer is compensated in the benefits received from the government in 
any and all of the ways that a government may benefit society.46 
The court made it quite clear that a "deeper principle" required a court 
to ensure that those paying taxes and assessments received some form of 
compensation: 
[The unifying] principle requires compensation in all cases, whether real es-
tate, money, or any other kind of property is involved; whether it is taken by 
the methods adopted under the right of eminent domain, or under the right of 
taxation, or by any other means. The principle lies deeper than mere forms or 
methods. It wotild be unreasonable to say that the authors of the [Takings 
Clause] intended to forbid the taking under one right without just compensa-
tion, and intended to allow such appropriation under another right; that they in-
tentionally closed one gap, but intentionally left another down by which the 
same wrong, in effect, could be accomplished.47 
Here, the court focuses on substance over form, in stark contrast to the 
Eastern Enterprises principle. It reads the Takings Clause to bar uncom-
pensated contributions regardless of the formal mechanism by which the 
government separates owners from their property. 
Cooley, in a leading treatise on constitutional law, summed up the clas-
sical view that taxation and takings differ in degree, not in kind: 
Taxation and eminent domain indeed rest substantially on the same foundation, as 
each implies the taking of private property for public use on compensation made; 
but the compensation is different in the two cases. When taxation takes money for 
the public use, the taxpayer receives, or is supposed to receive, his just compensa-
tion in the protection which government affords to life, liberty, and property, in the 
public conveniences which it provides, and in the increase in the value of posses-
46 People v. Daniels, 22 P. 159, 162 (Utah 1889). 
47 !d. at 163. 
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sions which comes from the use to which the government applies the money raised 
by the tax; and these benefits amply support the individual burden.48 
Richard Epstein's reading of the Takings Clause is in some respects 
(though not all, as we shall see shortly) a modem-day revival of the classi-
cal view Cooley articulated. Epstein argues, "[T]he differences between 
[taxation and takings] all go to matters of detail and technique, rather than 
to basic principle ... both may be used as instruments of confiscation."49 
He rejects "rigid schemes of classification" designed to blunt the compensa-
tion requirement," maintaining that "[t]axes and regulation are forms of tak-
ing, to be examined under principles applicable to all other takings."50 
2. Classical Grounds To Distinguish Takings from Taxation: The 
Breadth of the Burdens Jmposed.-Despite the fundamental similarity be-
tween taxation and takings, it is essential to establish a principle to distinguish 
them. As intimated in the beginning of this Article, if every tax is considered 
a taking, then the courts would be buried in taxpayer takings suits-unless the 
government can show that the taxpayer received some roughly equivalent 
benefit. The classical grounds for the distinction was simple: "Taxation op-
erates upon a community or upon a class of persons in a community and by 
some rule of apportionment. The exercise of the right of eminent domain op-
erates upon an individual, and without regard to the amount, or value exacted 
from any other individual, or class of individuals."51 Taxes fall on a broad 
swath of the community, with "some rule of apportionment"; takings are bur-
dens concentrated on one or a few citizens owning assets needed for some 
public project. In his treatise, Justice Cooley restated this rule: 
When the state has need of the property of citizens for its sovereign pwposes, it 
may lawfully appropriate it against the will of the owner either under the power to 
tax or the right of eminent domain. There is a difference in the two cases which is 
vital. When property is appropriated under the right of eminent domain, a particu-
lar item or parcel is taken, because for public purposes there is a special need of it, 
and the state takes it under proceedings which amount, so far as the owner is con-
cerned, to a forced sale. But taxation is based upon the idea of calling upon the 
people for equal and proportional contributions to the public wants, that the bur-
dens of govt. may fall ratably upon all who in justice should bear them. 52 
48 COOLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 14, at 715-16. Cooley offers a striking explanation for why it is 
preferable that governments rely on taxation, as opposed to uncompensated takings of whatever goods it 
required, to finance their operations: "no arbitrary government without regular and steady taxation 
could be anything but an oppressive and vexatious despotism, since the only alternative to taxation 
would be a forced extortion of the needs of government from such persons or objects as the men in 
power might select as victims." !d. at 678. 
49 Richard A. Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, & Confiscation, 20 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 433,434 (1982). 
50 !d. at 435. 
51 Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419,420 (1851). 
52 THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATION 102-03 (Clark A. Nichols ed., 4th ed. 1924) 
(emphasis added). 
202 
HeinOnline -- 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 203 2002-2003
97:189 (2002) Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings 
Taxation, then, couples burdens on a broad swath of the population with 
benefits from the use of tax revenues sprinkled over a similarly large portion 
of society. Takings, on the other hand, burden one or a relatively narrow sub-
set of property owners for projects with much wider social benefits. 
3. Drawing the Line: The Unfair Apportionment Test.-This broad-
narrow distinction is the first step of the classical approach to drawing the 
line between taxation and takings. There will be a gray area of difficult cases. 
Cooley's preceding quote thus introduced the second step in the classical test 
for distinguishing takings from taxation: there is no taking if "the bur-
dens ... fall ratably upon all who in justice should bear them."53 Courts, 
admitting the fundamental similarity of taxation and takings often used words 
like "just," "equitable," or "fairly apportioned" to determine when compensa-
tion was or was not required for the application of a particular tax: 
Exacting money by taxation and taking private property for public use, are dif-
ferent things. Both, it is true, are in one sense the exercise of a right to take the 
property of individuals for public use, but there is a broad distinction between 
them. Taxation exacts money from individuals as their share of a justly imposed 
and apportioned general public burthen, and the equivalent is presumptively re-
ceived in the benefits conferred by the government. Property taken for public 
use from one or more individuals only, by right of eminent domain, is taken not 
as his or their share of an apportioned public burthen, but as something distinct 
from and more than his or their share of the public burthens, and therefore the 
justice and necessity of a constitutional provision for compensation. 54 
Courts applying this "fair apportionment" test explicitly cited the Tak-
ings Clause as the source of the rule that constrained the power of taxation: 
There being no express constitutional declaration or prohibition directly appli-
cable to the power or subject of taxation, and none which in terms secures 
equality or uniformity in the distribution of public burthens, either general or 
local, there is no clause to which the citizen can, with certainty, appeal for pro-
tection against an oppressive and ruinous discrimination under color of the tax-
ing power, unless it be that which prohibits the taking of private property for 
public use, without compensation. 55 
Thus the classical test read Takings Clauses as requiring both a narrow and 
a disproportionate impact before requiring compensation. 
Epstein, in his restatement of the classical position, recognized the 
danger of allowing takings to swallow up taxation, or vice versa: "The 
question is whether these difficulties make it necessary to retreat to one of 
two extremes, both of which seem quite untenable. Either no taxation ... is 
53 /d. 
54 Booth v. Town of Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118,130 (1864). 
55 Cheaney v. Hooser, 48 Ky. 330,341 (I B. Mon. 1848) (holding that expanding town so as to impose 
town taxes on plaintiff is not a taking). 
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allowed, or all taxation ... is allowed."56 Epstein's answer to these diffi-
culties echoes the sources just cited: "the central insight is contained in a 
principle of American eminent domain law, whereby the disproportionate 
impact of a tax or regulation functions as an indirect measure of the ade-
quacy of compensation."57 
4. Courts Grant Legislatures Wide Latitude.-However, words like 
"just," "fair apportionment," "equitable," or "disproportionate impact" as 
employed by courts still do not define the line between taxation and takings 
with any precision. Epstein solves this imprecision for income taxation by 
asserting a close correspondence between income and benefits derived from 
governmental services and goods. Based on this tight correlation, he argues 
that only an income tax with one rate (a so-called "flat tax") satisfies the 
Takings Clause. For Epstein, the progressive income taxation, under which 
marginal rates increase with income, used by the United States dating back 
to the Civil War, violates the Takings Clause.58 Similarly, he argues that a 
sales tax must fall on all goods, because a selective sales tax places dispro-
portionate burdens on sellers of goods singled out for the tax. 59 
Although in many respects similar, Epstein's views part ways with 
classical doctrine. Classical courts and commentators believed that legisla-
tures have very wide leeway in setting taxes, and judges were encouraged to 
strike them down only in cases of extreme injustice or in cases of inequity 
or unfair apportionment. In the words of an early treatise writer, "[t]he 
power of taxation is a great governmental attribute, with which the courts 
have very wisely shown extreme unwillingness to interfere; but if abused, 
the abuse should share the fate of all other usurpations."60 
In the following extended quotation, an antebellum court acknowledges 
the deference due the legislature in establishing taxes, and the extraordinary 
facts that need to be present in order to justify judicial intervention: 
[The Takings Clause] was not intended to exclude or even to restrict the ordi-
nary power of general or local taxation inherent in the legislative function and 
conferred upon the legislative department of the government; and that there 
must necessarily be vested in that department, a wide range of discretion, not 
only as to the objects for which a tax, general or local, may be enforced, as to 
which its judgment would seem to be conclusive, but also as to the particular 
subjects or species of property which shall be liable to taxation, and as to the 
56 Epstein, supra note 49, at 437. 
57 !d. at 437-38. 
58 EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 297-300. Epstein's opinion is not entirely novel. In commenting on the 
federal income tax in the 1890s, one commentator argued that the levy's progressive rate structure went be-
yond the power of taxation and amounted to a taking. See STANLEY, supra note 3, at 142 (citing David A. 
Wells, Is the Existing Income Tax Unconstitutional?, F., Mar. 1895, at 18). 
59 EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 293-94. 
6° COOLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 14, at 795 (quoting SEDGWICK, CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY 
LAW 414 (1857)). 
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extent of territory within which a local tax shall operate. It would, therefore, 
be a task of extreme delicacy, for the judiciary to decide upon its own mere 
judgment, with respect to any of the particulars referred to, that the Legislature 
has exceeded the limits of the discretionary power with which it is in-
vested. . . . That limit can only consist in the discrimination to be made be-
tween what may with reasonable plausibility be called a tax, and for which it 
may be assumed that the objects of the taxation are regarded by the Legislature 
as forming a just compensation, and that which is palpably not a tax, but is, 
under the form of a tax, or in some other form, the taking of private property 
for the use of others or of the public, without compensation. Exact equality in 
the distribution of public burthens, and especially of such as are local, is per-
haps unattainable, and cannot form the test of the distinction referred to. There 
must be a palpable and flagrant departure from equality in the burthen as im-
posed upon the persons or property bound to contribute, or it must be palpable 
that persons or their property are subjected to a local burthen for the benefit 
of others, or for purposes in which they have no interest, and to which they 
are, therefore, not justly bound to contribute. The case must be one in which 
the operation of the power will be at first blush, pronounced to be the taking of 
private property without compensation, and in which it is apparent that the 
burthen is imposed without any view to the interest of the individual in the ob-
jects to be accomplished by it. 61 
Thus, under classical doctrine, the courts found taxes to be takings only in 
extreme cases, where the so-called tax impacted a very small portion of the 
population and provided no specific countervailing benefits to those liable 
for the tax. 
The Supreme Court, at the tum of the century, articulated a similar 
rule. For instance, in Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, the Court 
held unconstitutional taxes that are "so clearly and palpably an illegal en-
croachment upon private rights as to leave no doubt that such taxation by its 
necessary operation is really spoliation under the guise of exerting the 
power to tax. "62 In 1921, the Court reaffirmed this principle in upholding a 
Massachusetts state tax on income from intangibles that admittedly had a 
disparate impact on some localities. As the Court declared, 
a state tax law will be held to conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment only 
where it proposes, or clearly results in, such flagrant and palpable inequality 
between the burden imposed and the benefit received, as to amount to the arbi-
trary taking of property without compensation-to spoliation under the guise 
of exerting the power of taxing. 63 
When in 1916 the Supreme Court upheld the first income tax statute 
enacted after passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, the Court said that it 
would strike down a tax statute only if it was "so arbitrary as to constrain to 
the conclusion that it was not the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of 
61 Cheaney v. Hooser, 48 Ky. 330,344-45 (I B. Mon. 1848) (emphasis added). 
62 173 u.s. 592, 615 (1899). 
63 Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589,599 (1921) (citation omitted). 
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property, that is, a taking of the same in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment. "64 In 1934, the Court used similar language in upholding Oregon's 
steep sales tax on margarine: 
Except in rare and special instances, the due process of law clause contained in 
the Fifth Amendment is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred upon 
Congress by the Constitution .... That clause is applicable to a taxing stat-
ute ... only if the act be so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does 
not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and 
effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, as, for example, 
the confiscation of property. 65 
In summary, the classical view on the tax/takings line recognized the 
fundamental similarity between the two mechanisms, and developed a 
three-step test to distinguish them. First, this doctrine determined whether 
the burden fell on many (tax-like) or few (takings-like). Second, it tried to 
further delineate this many/few distinction by declaring that taxes must 
fairly apportion burdens. Finally, realizing that a large gray area remained, 
classical doctrine militated that courts should strike down tax legislation as 
a taking only in the most extreme cases of disproportionate impact. 
C. The Policy Goals of Takings Favor the Classical View 
The previous subsection demonstrated the deep historical roots of the 
view that it is the number of burdened parties, as well as the rough appor-
tionment of burdens, which distinguishes taxes from takings. The older 
pedigree of this classical view, alone, is scant reason to prefer it to the view 
articulated by the five Justices in Eastern Enterprises that fungibility de-
termines the line between taxes and takings. This subsection, however, 
shows that the classical view better serves the various goals of the Takings 
Clause. 
In Armstrong v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted the pur-
pose of the Takings Clause in very concise terms. Here, the Court declared 
that the Takings Clause "was designed to bar the Government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole."66 Since Armstrong, the Court 
has repeated this principle verbatim in virtually every takings case; in fact, 
both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion, in more than one case, 
have cited this very same language.67 And although the Armstrong decision 
64 Bmshaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. I, 24-25 (1916). Note that the challenged tax had a pro-
gressive rate structure, and so Epstein would argue that it violated the Takings Clause. EPSTEIN, supra note 
5, at 297-300; see also infra Parts IJI-IV (discussing progressive taxation in more detail). 
65 A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40,44 (1934) (citations omitted) (rejecting due process chal-
lenge to a state tax of fifteen cents a pound on margarine). Again, note that Epstein argues that such a selec-
tive sales tax is a taking. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 297-300. 
66 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960). 
67 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 607 (2001 ); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at 
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did not reference it, the Court had made a similar declaration of purpose in 
1893: requiring payment of just compensation "prevents the public from 
loading upon one individual more than his just share of the burdens of gov-
ernment."68 I label this the "anti-singling-out" motivation for the Takings 
Clause, in that it bars the government from singling out one or only a few 
property owners to bear public burdens. 
This anti-singling-out purpose is fairly general in scope. It is consis-
tent with, and captures the essence of, a number of more specific theories 
regarding the social ends served by the Takings Clause. Some scholars 
have argued that the compensation requirement was designed to protect a 
wealthy minority from majoritarian deprivations.69 Proponents of this view 
might define the range of governmental acts that unconstitutionally single 
out the wealthy more broadly than the Continuous Burdens Principle 
(CBP), as presented in Part IV, but they share this Article's basic perspec-
tive. Glynn Lunney, in articulating a theory seemingly diametrically op-
posed to minority exploitation, argued that concentrated minority interest 
groups have excessive political power and would block socially desirable 
legislation if not guaranteed compensation under the Takings Clause.70 Al-
though Lunny's concern about minoritarian oppression may be the opposite 
of the first theory, the root evil that requires remedying is the same: avoid-
ing singling out the few to bear the burdens of all. Frank Michelman argues 
that the Takings Clause minimizes the demoralization that results when the 
government concentrates losses in contexts where compensation is adminis-
tratively feasible but not paid.71 Although the meaning of "demoralization" 
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522,554 (1998) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1071 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. I, 9, 19 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
alternative holding); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987); First English Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,318-19 (1987); Connolly v. Pension Benefit 
Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,227 (1986); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 106 (1985); Prune Yard Shop-
ping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 
163 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123, 140 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
68 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). The modern Court has 
cited this language, in addition to the similar quotation from Armstrong, in Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass 'n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 512 (1987}, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 146 (1978), and PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980). In addi-
tion, the Court cited Monongahela in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 
238 (1897), the case in which, according to modem precedents, the Takings Clause was incorporated 
against the states under the Due Process Clause. 
69 See, e.g., William Fischel & Perry Shapiro, A Constitutional Choice Model of Compensation for 
Takings, 9 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 115 (1989); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the 
Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630 (1988); EPSTEIN, supra note 5. 
70 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
1892, 1938-41 (1992). Lunney draws directly on Armstrong. 
71 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, & Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1180-84 (1967). 
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is somewhat obscure, the primary reason Michelman would require com-
pensation is that losses are concentrated on one or a few citizens. 
Other models focus not on any intentional acts by the government, but 
on random losses inflicted by governmental measures. Under this view, the 
compensation requirement is analogous to insurance coverage: all citizens 
pay premiums in the form of a portion of their taxes and the government 
makes indemnification payments to those property owners inordinately 
burdened by governmental programs.72 Fischel emphasizes disproportion-
ate burdens in his application of Michelman's model to the military draft.73 
The anti-singling-out purpose encompasses these unintentional government 
acts, along with their intentional counterparts discussed above; it operates at 
a higher level of generality that does not distinguish between them. 
The anti-singling-out rationale, thus, is common to these seemingly di-
vergent theories and appears to be at the core of the purpose of the Takings 
Clause. It has nothing to do with the distinction between general monetary 
liabilities and specific goods embraced by a majority of the justices in East-
ern Enterprises. Rather, it has much to do with the classical view that takings 
and taxation should be distinguished based on the number of parties burdened 
by the exaction. Armstrong's oft-repeated anti-singling-out principle is in-
consistent with that aspect of Eastern Enterprises. Thus it is on policy 
grounds, more than pedigree grounds, that this Article rejects the money-
specific-asset distinction for drawing the line between taxes and takings. 
III. THE PRIMARY BA TILE GROUND TO DATE: LEGALITY OF 
PROGRESSIVE T AX.A TION 
There is very little modem commentary on how to distinguish taxation 
from takings. If Eastern Enterprises accurately represents modem thinking 
on the question, the lack of analysis is not surprising because there are no 
gray areas or close cases under such an understanding of the Takings 
Clause. What little scholarship there is primarily centers on whether pro-
gressive income taxation violates the Takings Clause. Richard Epstein, au-
thor of the earliest and most thorough analysis on the subject, maintains that 
progressive income tax rates-marginal rates increasing with income-
impose disproportionate burdens on the wealthy and, hence, violate the 
classical view of the constraints the Takings Clause imposes on taxation. 
However, those that defend progressive income taxation clearly consti-
tute the majority of academics and judges. Yet the case made in support of 
such progressive rates is surprisingly weak. This Part and Part IV, which 
72 See Lawrence Blume & DanielL. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 
72 CAL. L. REv. 569 (1984); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: 
Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269 (1988); 
Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv. 509 (1986). 
73 William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Just Compensation: Lessons from the Military 
Draft for the Takings Issue, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1996). 
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presents the Continuous Burdens Principle, make the stronger case that pro-
gressive income taxation does not violate the Takings Clause. The Article's 
case in favor of progressive rates is tripartite. First, subpart liLA surveys 
data ignored by both sides of the debate: the long history of progressive tax 
rates in the United States for both income taxes and other forms of taxation. 
Subpart III.A also briefly demonstrates that Supreme Court case law sup-
ports the constitutionality of progressive taxation. Subpart III.B then evalu-
ates existing normative arguments against and in favor of progressive 
income taxation. 
A. The History of Progressive Taxation and Positive Legal Doctrine 
1. History.-Progressive taxation dates back to the founding of the 
Republic. Politicians across the political spectrum endorsed it. Thomas 
Jefferson explicitly supported progressive taxation, declaring that a "means 
of silently lessening the inequality of property is to exempt all from taxation 
below a certain point, and to tax the higher portions of property in geomet-
rical progression as they rise."74 In 1798, Alexander Hamilton proposed a 
progressive real property tax with rates increasing from twenty cents per 
room for log houses to one dollar per room for houses with seven or more 
rooms. 75 Although Congress did not enact Hamilton's proposal, it did pass 
a similar progressive property tax, with rates starting at 0.2% for houses 
valued from $100 to $1000, and rising up to 1% for houses valued at more 
than $30,000.76 
In 1851, a New York state court explicitly rejected the argument that 
the Constitution required flat rate taxation.77 After listing three possible 
modes of taxation in the form of a head tax or capitation (i.e., fixed amount 
per person), a flat rate tax, and a progressive tax, the court gave the legisla-
ture the flexibility inherent in the classical view: "The application of any 
one of these rules or principles of apportionment, to all cases, would be 
manifestly oppressive and unjust. Either may be rightfully and wisely ap-
plied to the particular exigency to which it is best adapted."78 The court 
stated that the legislatures had mixed and matched these techniques in a va-
riety of ways, all apparently consistent with New York's Takings Clause: 
"Taxation is sometimes regulated by one of these principles, and sometimes 
74 THOMAS JEFFERSON, To James Madison, in 8 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 682 (Julian P. 
Boyd ed., 1953). 
75 GLENN W. FISHER, THE WORST TAX?: A HISTORY OF THE PROPERTY TAX IN AMERICA 40 (1996). 
76 HENRY CARTER ADAMS, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1816, at 54-56 (N.Y., Burt 
Franklin 1970) (1884). In the founding era Congress also enacted at least one "luxury" tax, on carriages 
used to transport persons. See Act of June 5, 1794, ch. XLV, I Stat. 373 (1794). Though not formally pro-
gressive, taxes on luxuries are fundamentally similar to income taxes with high exemptions: both impact 
only the wealthy. 
77 People ex rei. Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419 (1851 ). 
78 !d. at 427. 
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by another; and very often it has been apportioned without reference to lo-
cality or to the tax-payer's ability to contribute, or to any proportion be-
tween the burthen and the benefit. "79 Discussing one of the highest 
grossing taxes of its day, the court noted that some tariffs fell on a broad 
range of citizens, while others fell on a relatively narrow part of the com-
munity.80 The Court also noted that Congress imposed some of these tariffs 
simply to raise revenue, while it imposed others to protect domestic indus-
tries.81 All of these taxes, the court maintained, were consistent with the 
federal Takings Clause.82 
States began to enact income taxes in the 1800s, before the national gov-
ernment first imposed such a tax during the Civil War. By the 1850s, at least 
seven states had passed an income tax. 83 These state income taxes contained 
all the progressive features of today's national income tax: "[H]igh exemp-
tion levels, low and even progressive rates-were characteristic of these state 
laws."84 Thus, it was no surprise that the first national income tax, enacted 
during the Civil War, contained these same features. The exemption ranged 
from $600 to $2000 in annual income; this meant that the tax reached only 
0.2% to 1.3% of the population.85 Congress changed the rates frequently, but 
the structure was always progressive. Initially, rates ranged from 3% to 5%; 
by the end of the war they ranged from 5% to 10%.86 
This progressive structure was no accident. Commenting on the 1862 
tax, one scholar noted that "[t]he $600 exemption level reflected the inten-
tion to reach only a tiny, wealthy fraction of the population."87 Even a lead-
ing political opponent of the income tax in general, and progressive rates in 
particular, admitted that "no one doubts our constitutional power to levy 
this tax."88 Thus, during the time when the classical view on the line be-
tween taxation and takings still prevailed, even opponents of progressive 
income taxation conceded its constitutionality. 
The national income tax disappeared in 1872, but Congress reinstituted 
it in 1894. Although it had a single rate, 2%, its extraordinarily high ex-
79 /d. 
80 /d. 
81 /d. 
82 /d. 
83 Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. See, e.g., 
DELOS Q. KINSMAN, THE INCOME TAX IN THE COMMONWEALTHS OF THE UNITED STATES 37-39 (1903); 
EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 388-406 (1914). 
84 STANLEY, supra note 3, at 38. 
85 Jd. at 40-41 tbls. 1.5, 1.6. 
86 /d. at 41 tbl. 1.6. 
87 /d. at 30. 
88 /d. at 33 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., lsi Sess. 1715 (1864) (statement of Rep. Justin S. 
Morrill)). Morrill did go on to label progressive taxation as "no less than a confiscation of property," but 
his earlier admission of the measures' legality indicates that he used "confiscation" as a rhetorical as 
opposed to a legal term. 
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emption of $4,000, meant that the tax was very progressive, reaching only 
0.13% of the population.89 However, the Supreme Court struck down the 
tax one year later, holding that an income tax was a "direct" tax and, hence, 
had to be apportioned among the states based on population, not income.90 
The People soon initiated the amendment process to reverse the Supreme 
Court's invalidation of an income tax. During this period, from 1896 when 
the Court struck down the income tax, to 1913 when the states ratified the 
Sixteenth Amendment authorizing a national income tax without appor-
tionment among the states, progressive taxation was ubiquitous at the state 
and local levels of government: 
Since at least 1890 the climate within the state legislatures toward progressive 
taxation had grown increasingly favorable. The states had exhibited in their 
tax legislation widespread acceptance of the premises underlying congres-
sional recourse to income taxation; specifically, they had enacted inheritance 
and income tax laws which revealed their belief in the utility of the taxation of 
accumulated wealth, at very low but progressive rates, using very high exemp-
tion levels . . . . In 1890 only six states maintained inheritance taxes . . . and 
by 1913, 35 of the 48 states had enacted such laws . . . . Of the taxes in use in 
1911, at the peak of action over the ratification of the [federal] income tax 
amendment, about 60 percent were progressive in nature.91 
During this period, one state court upheld a progressive income tax against, 
inter alia, a charge that it was confiscatory.92 
Thus, during the era in which the states ratified the Sixteenth Amendment, 
progressive taxation simply was not controversial. As one scholar explained: 
[T]he widespread existence of inheritance taxation, and of judicial approval of 
the whole progressive package, eroded the plausibility of the old litany of evils 
which opponents of such taxation had marshaled since the 1890s: that progres-
sive taxation meant a war of poor against rich, that it constituted "confiscation," 
and that it represented the majority run amok through the law.93 
Indeed, few questioned progressivity during the proposal and ratification 
of the Sixteenth Amendment. Debate "was concerned chiefly with the pro-
priety of income as a tax base. Again there was some subsidiary concern 
with progression and it was well recognized that it would be possible to have 
a graduated tax under the Amendment."94 Senator Hughes implicitly admit-
89 JOHN F. WtTIE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 72-73 (1985). 
90 Pollock v. Fanners' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 584-86 (1895). Article I of the Constitution, 
in two separate sections, requires that "direct" federal taxes be apportioned among the states according to 
population. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 4. 
91 STANLEY, supra note 3, at 203-05. 
92 See State ex rei. Bolens v. Frear, 134 N.W. 673 (Wis. 1912)(holding that a progressive income tax 
was not so confiscatory as to violate basic principles of justice and equality). 
93 STAN LEY, supra note 3, at 209. 
94 WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 12 
(1953). 
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ted as much. He objected that the Sixteenth Amendment, as proposed, "did 
not provide for 'uniformity' in taxation-an attack on [the possibility of] 
graduated rates" under the Amendment as written.95 The senator's objection, 
in other words, implied an understanding that, without the word "uniformity," 
the Sixteenth Amendment permitted progressive income taxation. 
Another fact from which we can infer the constitutionality of progres-
sive income tax under the Sixteenth Amendment, is that the first income tax 
enacted after the Sixteenth Amendment's ratification had progressive rates 
and relatively high exemptions. Passed in 1913, this income tax exempted 
the first $3,000 of income (or $4,000 for married couples), and imposed 
marginal rates, starting at 1% and rising to 7%, for income over $500,000.96 
None of these terms raised any hackles. "At the time the tax was accepted 
as a natural and inevitable culmination of the constitutional amendment."97 
"If progressive taxation were so patently offensive to the democratic ideal 
that it could be characterized as an unconstitutional taking, at least a hint of 
that should have appeared in the legislative history. There is none."98 
2. Positive Legal Doctrine.--Given the long use and acceptance of 
progressive taxation, coupled with the universal understanding that Congress 
likely would enact a progressive income tax under the proposed Sixteenth 
Amendment, challenges were far from common. According to Blum and 
Kalven, a short, vociferous challenge to progressive rates that appeared in 
1916 was "perhaps most noteworthy because it appears to have been virtually 
the last gasp of constitutional objection to the principle ofprogression."99 
Massey attempts to revive this objection. He argues that the Supreme 
Court has never directly held that progressive taxes are not a taking. How-
ever, Massey's position is difficult to maintain. Although the Court failed 
to provide a crystal-clear ruling on the issue, this failure may be due more 
to the fact the plaintiffs were unlikely to raise an issue that everyone thinks 
is a sure loser. In fact, dicta gleaned from a number of Supreme Court 
cases uniformly and strongly suggest that progressive tax rates do not vio-
late the Takings Clause. 
For instance, the Supreme Court upheld a state inheritance tax contain-
ing progressive rates against an equal protection challenge. 100 Two years 
95 STANLEY, supra note 3, at 219 (citing I Senate Journal 618 (1911)). 
96 WITTE, supra note 89, at 77-78. 
97 !d. at 77. 
98 Leo P. Martinez, "To Lay and Collect Taxes'': The Constitutional Case for Progressive Taxation, 
18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. Ill, 126 (1999). 
99 BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 94, at 6 (citing Frank Warren Hackett, The Constitutionality of 
the Graduated Income Tax Law, 25 YALE L.J. 427, 440 (1916)). Though Massey does not cite Hackett's 
article, he elaborates on many of the same arguments. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 2. 
100 See Magoun v. Ill. Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898) (upholding Illinois inheritance tax). 
Justice Brewer, in dissent, argued that such unequal taxation violated the Constitution, though it is unclear 
what clause he thought the tax violated. See id. at 301-03. 
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later it upheld the progressive federal inheritance tax.101 The Court explic-
itly relied on historical practice to buttress the constitutionality of progres-
sive taxation, noting that such levies "were enacted without question from 
the very beginning, and have continued in an unbroken line to the present 
time, sanctioned by the founders of our institutions and approved in practi-
cal execution by all the illustrious men who have directed the public desti-
nies of the nation. "102 Consistent with the classic view of the distinction 
between taxation and takings, the Knowlton Court did concede that in ex-
treme cases taxes could amount to confiscation: 
If a case should ever arise, where an arbitrary and confiscatory exaction is im-
posed bearing the guise of a progressive or any other form of tax, it will be time 
enough to consider whether the judicial power can afford a remedy by applying 
inherent and fundamental principles for the protection of the individual .... 103 
The strong implication of the Court's language is that the progressive taxes 
at issue were not "confiscatory"; moreover, the language suggests that pro-
gressive taxation is not per se unconstitutional. 
The Court repeated these same themes in Brushaber v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., 104 in which it rejected a litany of constitutional objections to 
the first tax enacted under the Sixteenth Amendment. The Court, again, 
emphasized the long tradition of progressive taxation in the United States, 
declaring that all challenges raised "disregard[] the fact that in the very 
early history of the Government a progressive tax was imposed by Congress 
and that such authority was exerted in some if not all of the various income 
taxes enacted prior to 1894."105 And once again, the Court embraced the 
classical view that, in extreme cases, asymmetric taxation might violate the 
Takings Clause: 
[A] seeming exercise of the taxing power, [if] the act complained of was soar-
bitrary [that it was] not the exertion of taxation, but a confiscation of property, 
that is, a taking ... in violation of the Fifth Amendment, or what is equiva-
lent . .. so wanting in basis for classification as to produce a gross and patent 
inequality as to inevitably lead to the same conclusion. 106 
Stanley, a leading historian of the federal income tax concludes that the 
"opinion in Brushaber left little room for dispute over the firm tradition of 
progressive income taxation in the United States."107 
101 See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (upholding federal inheritance tax). 
102 !d. at 94. 
103 Jd. at 109-10. 
104 240 u.s. 1 (1916). 
105 !d. at 25 . 
106 !d. at 24-25. 
107 STAN LEY, supra note 3, at 229. 
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B. Normative Considerations of Progressive Income Taxation 
Besides these strong historical and legal grounds supporting the consti-
tutionality of progressive income taxation, this Article is also interested in 
the social desirability of such a tax, from both an efficiency and fairness 
perspective. Here, however, the evidence supporting progressive income 
taxation is much less clear. The following subsections weigh the case for 
progressive taxation from the perspectives of equity (fairness), efficiency 
(maximizing social welfare), and a combination of these criteria applicable 
if the wealthy tend to benefit disproportionately from public services. 
1. Equity.-Opponents of progressive taxation have used various 
analogies in arguing that single-rate income taxation, also called strictly pro-
portional taxation, or a flat tax, is a "neutral" and, hence, fair alternative. The 
roots of this idea date to the writings of Adam Smith, who analogized a na-
tion's citizens to co-owners of realty. Under the common law, joint owners 
contribute to necessary expenses in proportion to their interest in the estate. 
The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of govern-
ment, as nearly as possible, in proportion to ... the revenue which they re-
spectively enjoy under the protection of the state. The expence of government 
to the individuals of a great nations, is like the expence of management to the 
joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to 
their respective interests in the estate. 108 
F.A. Hayek proffered substantially the same defense of strict propor-
tionality, stating, "[A] person who commands more of the resources of so-
ciety will also gain proportionately more from what the government has 
contributed."109 More recent scholarship has repeated the mantra of flat-
rate taxation as fair taxation. 110 
Yet other scholars have questioned any a priori reason to favor single-
rate taxation. Boris Bittker, for instance, declared over thirty years ago that 
"proportionality is no more entitled to a presumption of fairness than pro-
108 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. 5, 
ch. 2, pt. 2, at 350 (Edward Cannan ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1904) (1776). Opponents of progressive 
taxation citing this passage either overlook or decline to cite Smith's comments in support of progressive 
taxation a few pages later: "A tax upon house-rents, therefore, would in general fall heaviest upon the rich; 
and in this sort of inequality there would not, perhaps, be any thing very unreasonable. It is not very unrea-
sonable that the rich should contribute to the public expence, not only in proportion to their revenue, but 
something more than in that proportion." /d. at 368. 
109 F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 316 (1960); see a/so MILTON FRIEDMAN, 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 175 (1962). 
110 Massey, supra note 2, at 123 ("[T]he tax burdens on incomes ... should be an equal proportion of 
all incomes."). 
The flat tax certainly gives a respectable matching [of burdens and benefits] .... In addition, a 
flat tax dispenses with the need to choose one of an infinite set of arbitrary progressive schedules. 
Some other baseline ... might well be part of a more comprehensive constitutional scheme, but in 
its absence, the flat tax is the most "natural" approach. 
EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 298-99. 
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gression. " 111 Scholars have continued to question this premise: 
Perhaps the most significant and pervasive assumption is that the burden of 
prooflies on supporters ofprogressivity. A proportionate tax is often seen as 
"natural" or "neutral," and therefore is thought to require no justificatory the-
ory . . . . The belief that progressive and regressive taxes must meet affmna-
tive burdens operates as a default assumption in favor of a proportionate 
tax .... tt2 
Barbara Fried highlights the intellectual weakness of the presumption 
in favor of a flat tax, finding that "[v]irtually all defenses of proportionality 
ultimately boil down to some variant of 'I know fairness when I see it,' 
claim, or [are tautologies]."113 Fried pinpoints the "missing piece," in re-
gard to arguments for strictly proportional taxation, as follows: 
I mean only to try to dislodge the apparently intractable notion that [propor-
tionate taxation] deserves to be adopted because it is "fair" in itself, or because 
it is an obvious instantiation of some other fairness principle. I am not arguing 
in favor of progressivity, regressivity, or any other rate structure on fairness 
grounds. The deeper moral is that no sensible theory of distributive justice 
would fix on rate structures themselves as fair or unfair. Rate structures are 
just a means to operationalize other prior, moral commitments about the proper 
role of government. 114 
Bankman and Thomas Griffith concur. After questioning the twin as-
sumptions that a proportionate tax is "somehow 'natural'" while progressive 
taxes "require justificatory theories," they maintain that "all rate structures 
must be premised upon, and measured by, a theory of distributive justice."115 
Bankman and Griffith conclude that "it is surprisingly difficult to derive a 
theory of distributive justice that supports a proportionate tax."116 
Not all commentators have ignored this requirement. For instance, 
Blum and Kalven noted that 
[t]o pass a judgment on whether a given schedule of graduated rates achieves 
"tax justice" from a redistributive perspective, we must resort to criteria that 
lie altogether outside the province of taxation . . . . What is at stake, and all 
that is at stake, is the central and formidable question of distributive justice in 
the society. 117 
111 Boris Bittker, The Income Tax: How Progressive Should It Be?, in BORIS BtTIKER, COLLECI'ED 
LEGAL ESSAYS 229, 233 {1989). 
112 Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Pro-
gressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905,1910-11 (1987). 
113 Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. L. REv. 157, 189 
(1999). 
114 !d. at 158. 
115 Bankman & Griffith, supra note 112, at 1907. 
116 /d.at1912. 
117 BLUM & KALVEN,JR., supra note 9, at 14--15. 
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Thus, Blum and Kalven evaluated assumptions about social welfare 
that are necessary to justify a progressive tax. For example, one common 
justification is that money has diminishing marginal utility for all or almost 
all people: the first dollars spent, on housing and shelter, yield much more 
satisfaction than the last dollars spent on hobbies or luxuries. If this is true, 
progressive taxation will increase social welfare, defined as maximizing the 
sum of all persons' utility, because such taxation will take money from 
those who used it for relatively lower utility luxuries and subsidize those 
lacking higher utility necessities. Measuring the marginal utility of money 
individually or across persons, however, is not possible. Blum and Kalven 
assert, without citation and without reasoned argument, that in order "[t]o 
yield progressive rates of tax ... the utility curve for money has to decline 
very sharply."118 Such a statement may have had intuitive appeal at the 
time it was written, when marginal income tax rates in the United States 
topped 70%; however, such a statement may be easily challenged today, 
when the top marginal rate is under 40%. 119 
This is an important quibble, and yet neither side of the debate can 
muster convincing, objective evidence in order to support its arguments. 
But there is a more fundamental objection to flat-rate taxation: it requires 
rather strong assumptions to rationalize such a narrow choice. Flat tax ad-
vocates typically invoke benefits theory, which justifies taxation based on 
benefits conferred. As Fried pointedly notes, however, "benefits theory 
leads to proportionate taxation if and only if the quantity of publicly sup-
plied goods that people consume is proportionate to income .... 120 Epstein 
argues that the assumption that the benefit of public goods increases in pro-
portion to income "gives a respectable matching" and then relies on the as-
sertion, seriously questioned above, that "the flat tax is the most 'natural' 
approach."121 
However, on closer inspection, there is nothing at all "natural" about 
the assumption that the benefit of public goods increases in strict proportion 
to income. "As even proponents of proportionate tax concede, that premise 
is highly implausible (a 'not clearly inappropriate assumption' is the best 
that Milton Friedman can do). "122 Fried makes a strong case that, for many 
public goods, benefits theory suggests not a flat-tax rate, but a flat-dollar 
tax: independent of income, a so-called capitation, or head tax. 
[The presumption of proportionality] is doubtful for many publicly provided 
goods, such as roads, fire protection, garbage collection, and schools. It is 
118 !d. at 18 (emphasis added). 
119 For historical tax rates, see The Century Foundation fig. 3b, at http://www.tcf.org/Publications/ 
Basics/Tax!History.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002). 
120 Barbara H. Fried, Why Do Libertarians Love Proportionate Taxation? The Case of Gauthier's 
Morals by Agreement 3 (Stanford Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 12, 2000). 
121 EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 298-99. 
122 Fried, supra note 120, at 3 (citing FRIEDMAN, supra note I 09, at 175). 
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clearly wrong for others, such as clean air, defense, and broadcast spectra, that 
are true "public goods" in the technical economic sense ... As public goods, 
of course, everyone consumes the exact same good-in which case a far more 
plausible outcome of benefits taxation would seem to be a highly regressive 
tax, at the extreme, a head tax, in which Bill Gates and Joe Dishwasher each 
pay the same fixed fee for access to a fixed package of public goods 0 0 0 0 123 
Fried's contention, that it is more natural to assume that the benefit of 
many public goods and services is equal and independent of wealth, seems 
at least as realistic as the assumption of flat-rate advocates that such bene-
fits increase in strict proportion to income or wealth. 
Although this Article will ultimately question the premise that all citi-
zens benefit in equal absolute amounts from public goods, such as police 
protection, 124 the power of Fried's point is that the premises of flat-tax ad-
vocates naturally lead to a head tax rather than a flat tax. Why are they so 
hesitant to follow their premises to their logical conclusion? 
Further insight into the thinking of flat-tax advocates may be gained by 
considering income tax exemptions, such as exempting the first $X of in-
come from any taxation at all. Surprisingly, 
almost none of the proponents of proportionality ... have in fact supported 
proportionate taxation. Instead, they have supported a so-called degressive 
version of a progressive tax, in which the first x dollars of income or consump-
tion, sufficient to cover basic needs, is taxed at a zero rate, and all income or 
consumption above that is taxed at the same positive rate. 125 
Blum and Kalven were quite frank in analyzing the motivation for this ex-
ception: "One obstacle that confronts this aspiration toward tax neutral-
ity ... arises from the brute fact that there is poverty . . . . Under these 
circumstances, a fully neutral tax just does not work."126 
At least one opponent of progressive taxation, Justice Field, had the 
courage of his convictions and condemned exemptions as illegal forms of 
progressivity, on par with a progressive rate structure. 127 In the main, how-
ever, opponents of progressive taxation, cognizant of this "brute fact," often 
seem oblivious to another fact: that introducing an exemption into the in-
come tax results in a type of progressive tax. An article challenging the 
constitutionality of progressive taxation dismissed this problem in one 
blithe sentence. 128 
123 !d. 
124 See infra Part !V.B. 
125 Fried, supra note 113, at 160-61. Use of the term "degressive" to denote progression achieved by 
exempting the first $X of income apparently was coined in Blum & Kalven, supra note 9, at 12-13. 
126 BLUM & l<ALVEN, JR., supra note 9, at II. 
127 Pollock v. Fanners' Loan & Trust Co., !57 U.S. 429,599-600,607-08 (1895) (Field, J., concur-
ring). 
128 
"We may dismiss a consideration of the size of the exemption." Hackett, supra note 99, at 430. 
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Yet, the inconsistency of exemptions with a flat tax is manifest: 
It is hard to overstate, however, the difficulties that [conceding the necessity of 
an exemption for the poor] entails for those whose opposition to any greater 
degree of progressivity via a graduated rate structure is based on the fact that 
such progressivity is motivated by purely redistributive concerns ... why stop 
there? ... why not raise the exemption level [higher]? ... Surely, Frank Taus-
sig was right in declaring many years ago that "[t]he demand for the exemp-
tion of the lowest tier of incomes results from the same state of mind as the 
advocacy of progressive taxation .... "129 
The almost universal support for exemptions among critics of progressive 
rates "suggests that fairness as well as efficiency grounds underlie their 
support for proportional taxation."130 This Article will address efficiency 
shortly. For present purposes, however, once one admits that some notion 
of redistributive justice (i.e., notions of fairness or equity), it is difficult to 
explain why some level of exemption is precisely the correct amount of 
fairnessP 1 Most advocates of strict proportionality in taxation simply fail 
to specify what social benefit function they aim to maximize; without pro-
viding a metric to compare results, there is simply no basis for choosing one 
tax policy over another.132 
2. Efficiency.-Specifying a social welfare function is controversial. 
There is no consensus on the proper objective function. Perhaps for this 
reason, "[t]o the extent that supporters of proportional taxation do offer a 
positive case for their position, the argument is based almost exclusively on 
efficiency grounds."133 Flat-tax advocates note that progressive taxation 
may impose stiff marginal tax rates (i.e., the rate applied to the last dollars 
earned) on high-income earners, many of whom are society's most produc-
tive members. These taxes encourage substitution of leisure for cash in-
come and result in the deadweight loss inherent in all forms of taxation 
avoidable by substitution. A similar argument applies to savings decisions: 
as the income tax applies to dividends, interest, and other investment 
income, higher marginal rates will impose suboptimal substitution away 
from taxed activities. 
In rebuttal, Bankman and Griffith first note that it is not progressivity 
129 Fried, supra note 113, at 161-62 (last alteration in original) (quoting FRANK TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES 
OF ECONOMICS 499 (1999)). 
130 Bankman & Griffith, supra note 112, at 1966. 
131 Blum and Kalven offer one possible standard. They maintain that there is universal support for an 
exemption that takes the truly poor off the tax rolls: "The much more fundamental question ... is whether 
society should concern itself with redistribution only insofar as it is necessary to deal with poverty, or 
whether it should extend its concern to inequalities of 'surplus' income." BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 
9, at 14. Defining the poverty level may be tractable. Note that this is consistent with the classical view, 
under which taxation to support true paupers was permissible. See infra text accompanying note 217. 
132 See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 112, at 1913. 
133 /d. at 1966. 
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itself that imposes deadweight loss, but rather high rates. Thus, a progres-
sive set of rates with a moderate top rate will impose less deadweight loss 
than a flat tax at a high rate. Moreover, drawing on formal models of opti-
mal taxation, Bankman and Griffith describe an efficient income tax that is 
progressive in its overall structure. Specifically, James Mirrlees has shown 
that, in a simple model making minimal assumptions, the optimal tax struc-
ture is ( 1) a cash transfer payment to lower wage workers (called a "demo-
grant"), coupled with (2) declining marginal tax rates on higher incomes. 
Declining rates mean that the marginal rate for very productive workers is 
relatively low so they have less incentive to substitute leisure for work. 134 
There is a deeper problem for advocates of strict proportionality arguing 
against progressivity on efficiency grounds. Flat-rate income taxation causes 
deadweight losses similar to progressive taxation; in other words, because 
taxpayers can reduce their tax bill by working less, both forms of taxation in-
volve deadweight losses. Thus, "the same efficiency-based reasoning that re-
jects a progressive tax in favor of a proportionate tax would, if applied 
consistently, reject a proportionate tax in favor of a lump-sum head tax ... an 
exclusive concern for economic efficiency implies a regressive, rather than 
proportional, tax."135 As has been noted, however, there is almost universal 
opposition to head taxes and regressive taxes in general. This opposition im-
plies that even flat tax supporters do not rely on efficiency alone in selecting a 
desirable tax policy. They implicitly try to satisfy some equity concerns, and 
those equity concerns force them to deviate from a head tax and even from 
strictly proportionate taxation (i.e., without any low-income exemption). 
Blum and Kalven point out a somewhat nonconventional efficiency ar-
gument for progressive taxation: it may be the least-cost way for the wealthy 
to quiet social disorder among the poor. They observe that "it may be that 
there are limits to the peaceful tolerance by the mass of the population of 
great disparities in wealth and that a closer approximation to equality is im-
portant insurance against revolution."136 Blum and Kalven cite Henry C. 
Simons for an extended defense of what might be characterized as extortion: 
[P]rogressive taxation is a workable, democratic method for dealing with ine-
quality. The alternative of unionists is to send workers out in packs to exploit 
and expropriate by devices which resemble those of bandit armies. The one 
device is inherently orderly, peaceful, gradualist, and efficient. It is the device 
oflaw. The other is inherently violent, disruptive, and wasteful in the extreme. 
One calls for debate, discussion, and political action; the other for fighting and 
promiscuous expropriation. 137 
134 !d. at 1918-21; see also id. at 1945-48; James A . Mirr1ees, An Exploration in the Theory of 
Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. Sruo. 175 (1971). 
135 !d. at 1913 ;seealsoFried,supranote 113,at 19()...91. 
136 BLUM & KALYEN, JR., supra note 94, at 77. 
137 !d. at 71 n.178 (quoting Henry C. Simons, Some Reflections on Syndicalism, 52 J. POL. ECON. 19 
(1944)). 
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Epstein takes a less sanguine view, deeming redistributionary measures de-
signed to buy social peace as "little more than a strategic bribe."138 
It may seem strange to classify this social bribery as an efficient practice 
because economics usually assumes that all actors are law-abiding, or that the 
police and courts effectively can curtail extortion instead of indulging it. If, 
however, one assumes that the poor are willing and able to inflict costs on 
their wealthier neighbors, redistributionary taxation may be superior to the al-
ternatives (e.g., social unrest, or expensive expansion of the police force). 
3. Progressivity as a Proxy for Disproportionate Benefits of Law and 
Order to the Wealthy.-This subsection briefly explores a couple of closely 
related justifications for progressive taxation, both of which revolve around 
benefits to law and order that accrue disproportionately to the wealthy. The 
first justifies progressivity as an implicit wealth tax on non-income-
producing property. The legal system creates an environment that not only 
enhances the ability to generate income, but also protects accumulated 
wealth. The income tax imposes countervailing burdens on those benefiting 
from a safe environment for earning income and imposes such burdens on 
those forms of wealth that generate income (e.g., stock dividends, bond in-
terest, and patent royalties). Yet, forms of wealth that do not generate in-
come, such as furs, jewelry, and vintage wine, escape taxation despite the 
fact that their owners benefit from legal protection of such property every 
bit as much as generators of income and owners of income-producing 
wealth. 139 In theory, we could impose a separate tax on such wealth, but 
administratively this might be expensive. However, progressivity in in-
come taxation may achieve a similar allocation of burdens at a lower ad-
ministrative cost. The key assumption behind using progressivity to mimic 
a tax on non-income-producing wealth is that, as income increases, wealth 
in general increases disproportionately. There is strong empirical evidence 
for this relationship. 140 
138 EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 316. 
139 In a future article, the author will explore a self-reporting wealth tax that may be administratively 
cheap. The key idea is that citizens who do not report some form of wealth will not be eligible for most 
forms of legal protection. The law would still protect simple possession (to prevent chaos); thus, for exam-
ple, the police would always prevent someone from ripping jewelry off the owner's body. The courts 
would also entertain a private suit for recovery if the owner could identify the thief. For an owner who did 
not report the jewelry on his wealth tax return, however, the police would not help recover property once 
stolen. The tax would exclude those forms of wealth that generate income or capital gains that present na-
tional and state income taxes reach. It would also exclude wealth subject to separate taxation (e.g., real 
property). For administrative simplicity, the tax would include a relatively large exemption, so that most 
people would not have to file to obtain full protection for their wealth. To encourage voluntary reporting, 
insurers would be obligated to report all personal property insured above the exempted amount. The author 
argues that a special excise tax on such property is less workable, as it is relatively easy to buy most forms 
of personal property out of the taxing jurisdiction and import them without paying such a "use" tax. 
140 
"(A]s adjusted gross income (AGI}-the primary measure of income in the current income tax-
increases, wealth increases disproportionately." David J. Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive 
Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REv. 499,503 (2000) (providing data to support assertion). 
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For similar reasons, law and order may be a luxury good dispropor-
tionately desired by those with the most to lose from radical change or 
chaos. Arthur Pigou, a leading neoclassical economist, and no radical, sug-
gested as much: 
[P]eople's economic well-being depends on the whole system of law, includ-
ing the laws of property, contract and bequest, and not merely upon the law of 
taxes. To hold that the law about taxes ought to affect different people 's satis-
factions equally, while allowing that the rest of the legal system may properly 
affect them very unequally, seems not a little arbitrary. 141 
Leo Martinez captured the same idea: "The intangible well-being repre-
sented by economic and social stability are perhaps most valuable to the 
wealthy."142 These observations are nothing new. As Stanley has noted: 
Proponents of the renewal of the [income) tax [in the early 1870s] generally 
voiced support on two grounds: that those with the greatest wealth had the 
greatest ability to pay, and, more important, that they received the most bene-
fits from the government and therefore had the greatest responsibility to pay a 
tax on the product of those benefits.143 
Arguments that the wealthy benefit disproportionately from goods and ser-
vices provided by the state thus have a long pedigree. 
Implicit in these arguments is the idea that, at least to some extent, we 
can apportion the benefits of basic governmental services, such as police 
and courts. Such services certainly have some of the attributes of public 
goods; accordingly, there is no way to determine market prices (i.e., fees) 
for their consumption. Blum and Kalven expand on the concept of public 
goods in order to question whether the wealthy benefit disproportionately 
from the existence of law and order: 
Although admittedly many expenditures of government cannot be traced di-
rectly, there is, as was suggested in the discussion of benefit theory, some 
plausibility to the assumption that all citizens benefit equally from such ex-
penditures. The clearest instance is that of military expenditures for exterior 
security. Here the life and freedom of everyone in the community are 
equally at stake, and in this sense everybody equally benefits from the pro-
tection. 144 
Massey makes many of the same arguments about the military, as well as 
the police: 
A national defense that is adequate to protect Americans from external harm to 
their persons will also protect their property at no extra cost. Moreover, the 
level of protection necessary to defend tangible property does not vary propor-
141 ARTHUR C. P1GOU, A STUDY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 44 (3d rev. ed. 1951). 
142 Martinez, supra note 98, at 147. 
143 STANLEY, supra note 3, at46. 
144 BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 94,at 77 . 
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tionally with its value ... the cost of protecting intangible assets is a fixed 
cost, unrelated to the assets' value. 145 
These opinions, that basic peace and order either benefit citizens 
equally or in strict proportion to wealth, are based on intuition alone; more-
over, there are equally plausible arguments to the contrary. The wealthy 
have much more to lose from either a foreign invasion or a radical change 
in the internal legal system. The poor rationally might well favor little or 
no national defense. Massey's assertion that "the cost of protecting intan-
gible assets [by far the largest component of wealth] is a fixed cost, unre-
lated to the assets' value," is not plausible. 146 The greater the wealth at 
stake, the more others will be willing to expend to expropriate it. For ex-
ample, valuable patents are more attractive targets for infringement, and 
thus the state will need to devote more regulatory, police, and judicial 
resources to protecting such property rights. 
Finally, note that using only an income tax enables non-income-
bearing wealth to escape taxation. There are other feasible bases for a 
broad-based tax that could yield revenues equal to the present income tax; a 
wealth tax is one such alternative. It is difficult to determine whether such 
a tax would be more efficient, but it appears no less equitable. Both target 
ability to pay in a rough way and it is not clear which more precisely serves 
this standard of fairness. "The classic equitable justification for the income 
tax is that a tax should be based on ability to pay and income is the best 
measure of ability to pay .... however, a person's wealth appears to be as 
fair a basis for distributing a tax as her income."147 To the extent that 
wealth, especially non-income-bearing wealth, increases more than propor-
tionately with income, a flat-rate wealth tax would impose burdens similar 
to a progressive income tax. 
In summary, there are good policy arguments in favor of progressive 
income taxation; however, these arguments are hardly dispositive . As a 
matter of history and positive law, the case for the legality of progressive 
taxation is strong.148 Nonetheless, advocates of progressive taxation have 
failed to provide guidance on how to determine when taxes turn into tak-
ings. Missing is a doctrinal principle that unifies taxation with other 
sources of potential takings and that demonstrates, under general princi-
ples of takings law, that progressive taxation does not violate the Takings 
145 Massey, supra note 2, at 106--07. 
146 /d. 
147 Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 140, at 500. 
148 After reviewing the evidence, it is somewhat difficult to understand the attraction of strictly propor-
tionate tax rates. Two articles have suggested that flat rates may be a sort of focal point, a solution that 
stands out for its simplicity and uniqueness as an intermediate position between regressive and progressive 
rates. "Because it is so simple, a tax structure that imposes the same rate on all individuals is more 'promi-
nent' than any of the countless rate structures that impose different rates on individuals of different rate 
classes." Bankman & Griffith, supra note 112, at 1914; see also Fried, supra note 113, at 193-95. 
222 
HeinOnline -- 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 223 2002-2003
97:189 (2002) Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings 
Clause, even though other taxes do (e.g., the "Bill Gates Tax"). The clas-
sical view's two-part test (wide impact and fair apportionment) is a start-
ing place: since our current progressive income tax impacts a large 
percentage of the population, it passes the first part of the classical stan-
dard. One then confronts the second part of the classical test, whether 
progressive taxation "unfairly apportions" the burden of taxation. This 
part of the test provides little guidance, as many divergent definitions ex-
ist for unfair apportionment. Moreover, this standard does not exclude ar-
guments, such as Epstein's, that progressive rates by definition impose 
disproportionate burdens. Accordingly, the next section, Part IV, explains 
the continuous burdens principle (CBP), a rule of general application that 
illustrates why progressive income taxation is not a taking, though the Bill 
Gates Tax is. 
IV. THE CONTINUOUS BURDENS PRINCIPLE 
In arguing that all progressive taxation amounts to a taking, Massey 
complains that fellow professors dismissed Epstein's Takings book "be-
cause it stated a conclusion that was unpalatable to the orthodoxy of the po-
litical left that dominates academia."149 Although it is difficult to verify 
such an imputation of collective state of mind, my problem with Epstein's 
thesis is less colorful: it deems unconstitutional existing practices and pro-
grams long viewed as beyond challenge. In particular, the thesis that pro-
gressive income taxation violates the Takings Clause is counter to 
longstanding and continuing practice. 
Current doctrine that must justify progressive taxation, however, has its 
own problems. For our purposes, its biggest shortcoming is its absolute 
rule that taxation is never a taking. Thus, for example, a steep tax aimed at 
the single richest person in the nation, like the Bill Gates Tax example dis-
cussed previously, does not violate the Takings Clause under current doc-
trine. This is in tension with the Supreme Court's oft-repeated language 
from Armstrong that the core purpose of the Takings Clause is "to bar the 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, 
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. "150 
Such a steeply progressive tax is also in acute tension with the Supreme 
Court's foundational declaration that when diminution "reaches a certain 
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent 
domain and compensation to sustain the act."151 
149 Massey, supra note 2, at 85-86. 
150 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
151 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922). Holmes restated this rule in the context of regu-
lation: "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." /d. at 415. Nothing in Mahon suggests that this principle 
applies to regulation and regulation only. 
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The Continuous Burdens Principle (CBP) developed in this Part pro-
vides a doctrinal middle ground, a rule under which progressive taxation 
generally is deemed not a taking, but under which the extreme progressivity 
of the Bill Gates tax is deemed a taking. This undertaking has surprising 
similarity to Epstein's work. He aimed to develop rules that avoided the 
extremes of declaring that either no tax was a taking or that every tax was. 
He asked, "How can we avoid this extreme result, steer a middle course, 
and identify those forms of taxation ... that should survive, and those that 
should be condemned?"152 The CBP draws the line between taxation and 
takings at a different location than does Epstein, but it shares his view that 
at some point taxation surely can shade over into a taking. 
A. The Continuous Burdens Principle 
1. Basic Idea.-The CBP can be viewed as no more than a formal, 
and more rigorous, version of the principle enunciated in Armstrong: the 
Takings Clause "bar[s] the Government from forcing some people alone 
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole."153 Instead of looking at absolute burdens to 
property owners, independent of burdens imposed on other citizens in the 
condemning jurisdiction, the idea is that the marginal burden imposed on 
an owner or group of owners must be examined. By marginal burden I 
mean the amount by which the burden imposed on an owner or group of 
owners equally burdened exceeds the burden imposed on the next most 
burdened owner. 
Applying this standard to every owner in a certain jurisdiction yields 
the CBP: if a governmental measure imposes costs in such a way that there 
are no discontinuous "jumps" in marginal burdens, there is no taking. One 
way to picture the CBP's application is to imagine a chain of comparisons, 
from the burden imposed on the least burdened person (B[J]) to the burden 
imposed on the most burdened person (B[N}). The CBP requires that each 
difference in the following series be relatively small: 
B[2]-B[l], B[3]-B[2], ... , B[N]-B[N-1] 
If there are discontinuous jumps in the series-any difference that exceeds 
some minimal threshold-there may be a taking. 
In order to explore the virtues of the CBP, I will use burden curves, 
which are simple graphical devices that encapsulate marginal benefits picto-
rially. Burden curves come in two varieties: gross burden curves, which do 
not include any offsetting benefits; and net burden curves, which include 
such benefits. One constructs a gross burden curve by "lining up" property 
owners in order on the horizontal axis, from the person least burdened by a 
152 Epstein, supra note 49, at 435. 
153 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. 
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governmental measure, to the person most burdened. One then graphs the 
burden imposed on each person along the vertical axis. Given the ordering 
of persons along the horizontal axis, the resulting curve can never slope 
upward; it must be everywhere flat or decreasing. Consider, for instance, a 
gross burdens curve for the taking of a single house without payment of 
compensation: 
0 
Gross 
Burden 
FIGURE 1 
Gross Burdens, 
Taking of a Single House 
Without Compensation 
everyone else 
owner 
-
The large jump in this curve is a graphical clue that compensation is re-
quired under the CBP. Generally, a gross or net benefit curve violates the 
CBP when its slope becomes excessively steep along any interval. 
One derives net burden curves from gross benefit curves by raising 
each point to reflect the benefit that each person received as a result of the 
governmental program (e.g., from taking a property, spending tax revenues, 
regulating). Weighing benefits as implicit compensation is an established 
rule in condemnation law}54 When one factors in benefits, one does notre-
order people. On a net burden curve they remain in the order established 
154 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 422 (stating that "average reciprocity of advantage" in a public measure can ex-
cuse obligation to pay just compensation); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992); 
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,715 (1987). 
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for gross burdens. This is done to retain information about the structure of 
the tax or other burden imposed. Note, then, that net benefit curves need 
not be flat or downward sloping; they can and at times will have positive 
slopes over some range of persons. Ultimately one is interested in net bene-
fit curves, as they reflect true burdens borne. Sharp jumps, or kinks in a net 
burden curve correspond to discontinuous marginal burdens, which are vio-
lations of the CBP. Consider the net burden curve for the taking of a single 
house, without compensation, under the assumption that the resulting gov-
ernmental project, such as a road, benefits all citizens equally: 
0 
Net Benefit/ 
Burden 
FIGURE 2 
Net Burdens, 
Taking of a Single House 
Without Compensation 
This curve starkly illustrates that taking a single piece of property for a so-
cial benefit, without compensation, imposes a discontinuous burden on the 
owner of the taken parcel. 
Sometimes, especially for general revenue taxes, the allocation of 
benefits is far from clear. In order to draw net burden curves in such cases, 
we must start with the gross burdens curve and derive a net burdens curve 
by making assumptions about the allocation of benefits from governmental 
use of resources gleaned from the people. 
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2. Defining Burdens.-Before proceeding, one must carefully spec-
ify how one measures burdens and benefits. There are two obvious candi-
dates: absolute dollars and percentages of the property taken by the 
government. Embedded in this choice between the two alternatives are 
fundamental issues of fairness of which there is little social consensus. This 
section makes no attempt to prove that one choice or the other is fairer, 
based on some axiomatic theory of justice or on a carefully defined social 
welfare function. Rather, this subsection endeavors to show that using per-
cent burdens as the relevant metric for takings analysis is consistent with 
widely held assumptions about fairness. Most importantly, it is consistent 
with the assumptions of those who, contrary to the argument of this Article, 
claim that progressive income taxation is a taking. 
If one uses absolute dollars to measure burdens, discontinuity in the 
distribution of the asset being taxed/taken will affect the continuity of bur-
dens in ways that almost nobody seems to find relevant. For example, con-
sider a flat-rate income tax that almost no mainstream theorists find 
objectionable. Assume that Bill Gates has a substantially higher income 
than the next highest income taxpayer. If one uses absolute dollars due, 
even a flat tax produces discontinuous burdens: 
FIGURE 3 
Gross Burdens of Flat Tax 
Burdens in Absolute$$ 
Bill Gates Has Outlier Income 
2nd Highest 
Inco;e 
·~I 
Gross 
Burden 
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Bill Gates's tax bill will substantially exceed that of the next highest taxed 
person; thus, using absolute dollar burdens leads to a result inconsistent 
with the near universal view that a flat income tax does not violate the Tak-
ings Clause.155 
Using percent burdens avoids this difficulty, as the gross burden curve 
for a flat-income tax is a horizontal line without such discontinuous jumps. 
The next subsection, by marching through a series of applications, shows 
that the percent CBP classifies a wide variety of governmental measures 
just as existing takings law does. 
Unfortunately, using percent burdens fails to eliminate one problem 
faced by existing takings law: the so-called denominator problem. If one is 
going to gauge burdens by percentages, one must choose a denominator by 
which to divide the dollar burden imposed to reach a percent diminution. 
This is a difficult problem with which courts continue to struggle.156 For 
income, the denominator is relatively uncontroversial: "[A]ll income from 
whatever source derived,"157 less any deductions and credits permitted un-
der the tax code. Similarly, a wealth tax, including all wealth, in whatever 
form held, seems workable and relatively uncontroversial. For land, and 
perhaps some forms of personal property, however, the denominator is less 
clear. Does one include parcels adjacent to a condemned parcel owned by 
the same person? This Article does not address the denominator problem; 
rather, it imports without modification those standards that courts have de-
veloped to address the issue. 
3. Applying the CBP.-This Article begins its study of the CBP by 
drawing gross and net burden curves for the canonical case of a taking: state 
expropriation of a single parcel of land. The choice between absolute and 
percent burdens has no effect on the shape of either curve, so there is no 
need to redraw them. The net burden curve shows, under plausible assump-
tions about the benefits of the government's use of the parcel, that there is a 
huge jump-a discontinuity-in burdens between everyone else and the 
owner of the taken parcel. As this is the canonical case of a taking, it is im-
portant, if not impressive, that the CBP deems this a taking requiring com-
pensation. With proper compensation, the singled-out landowner is placed 
on equal footing with everyone else, remedying the unconstitutional discon-
tinuity that violated the CBP. 
ISS It is possible that there will be many discontinuous jumps in income: the income of the second high-
est earner may be much higher than the third; or incomes might be continuous from the highest to the 22nd 
highest, and then drop off discontinuously to the 23rd highest income. 
IS6 The Supreme Court has not given definitive guidance on the denominator problem, and thus the 
lower federal and state courts continue to struggle with the problem. See. e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. 
United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); K&K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 551 N.W.2d 
413 (Mich. App. 1996). See generally STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 11.7 (2d ed. 2001) 
(ascertaining the "Takings Fraction" or "Relevant Parcel"). 
IS7 26 U.S.C. § 6l(a) (2000) ("Gross income defined"). 
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FIGURE4 
Net Burdens, 
Taking of a Single House 
With Compensation 
Raising the gross burden curve by a fixed amount for each person factors in 
the addition of benefits. In the case of the taking of a particular piece of 
land, there is no natural way to calculate percent gains. Unlike the case of 
the taxes considered immediately above, there is no natural base to use as 
the denominator in calculating percent net burdens. Thus, there is not a 
unique ordering of the net burdens imposed on each citizens. Thus, the use 
of a flat line to model benefits is arbitrary. In studying the CBP, however, 
one is not so much worried about the precise shapes of the burden curves as 
with the existence of discontinuous jumps. For instance, it seems unlikely 
that a new road confers discontinuous benefits on those whose property is 
not taken for the project. Some landowners will benefit more than others, 
such as those owning land close to an exit, but these benefits are likely to be 
continuous, as the owner of land two-hundred feet from an intersection will 
benefit less, but only slightly less, than the owner of property one-hundred 
feet from the exit. 
Next, consider the gross burdens curve for the two taxes I wish to dis-
tinguish. First, the "Bill Gates Tax" gross burden curve looks exactly like 
the curve for the expropriation of a single parcel. The curve's similarity to 
the expropriation of a single parcel captures the intuition that, if focused 
narrowly enough, a tax looks like a classic example of a taking. 
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Now consider the gross burden curve for a hypothetical progressive in-
come tax bearing a rough similarity to the current U.S. personal income tax. 
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FIGURE6 
Gross Burdens of 
Progressive Income Tax 
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This graph reflects a tax, much like current taxation schemes, with an 
exemption for the lowest earners. The curve depicts burdens for an income 
tax with three marginal rates, with each rate applied to income above three 
corresponding income levels. The actual percent burden on taxpayers sub-
ject to a given marginal rate is always less than that marginal rate, as they 
pay lower rates on income below each threshold. By definition, the gross 
burden curve orders taxpayers by income, from lowest to highest. The key 
observation about this curve is that there are no discontinuities or jumps be-
cause burdens increase in small increments from the lowest earner to the 
highest. Thus, before accounting for benefits, this gross burdens curve sug-
gests that a prototypical progressive income tax is not a taking under the 
CBP. 
These gross burden curves, of course, do not account for the benefits 
received by taxpayers under either tax. Calculating the benefits received 
by each person is not possible. Beyond the number and complexity of 
governmental expenditures, many of the goods provided by the state are 
public goods that, in practice, are impossible to price. The phrase "public 
good" is a technical term that requires some elaboration. The government 
levies the income tax, in the main, to provide benefits to a large portion of 
the citizenry in the form of goods and services, such as police, fire, and 
military protection; roads, canals, ports, airports, and air traffic control; 
and clean air. The list of such goods and services is endless. Many, 
though not all, goods provided by the government are public goods, at 
least in part. Public goods differ from private goods in two key respects. 
First, their consumption is nonrivalrous: the fact that Anne "consumes" 
police services every day does not generally diminish Betty's ability to 
enjoy police protection. The same, however, cannot be said of a Big Mac. 
Second, it is difficult or impossible to exclude anyone from consuming 
the good or service. 158 Nonexclusivity makes it difficult to rely on private 
parties to supply a good, because an inability to exclude makes it difficult 
to charge anyone for the good. The state, if anyone, must provide such 
goods. 
But what apportionment of the cost of such public goods is fair? Un-
fortunately, there is no single theoretically pleasing and practically feasible 
mechanism to determine a single general revenue tax that defmes how 
much each citizen should contribute toward the cost of public goods. All 
citizens, roughly, consume the same police services, the same military pro-
tection, and the same clean air. 
The impossibility of charging each citizen a unique price for public 
benefits undermines simpler assertions that various taxes violate the Tak-
ings Clause. As a critic of the first income tax's progressive rates rhetori-
cally asked, "What sound reason, we inquire, can be brought forward for 
158 RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY 8. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
41-45 (5th ed. 1989). 
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treating the payment of taxes after a different manner than payment for 
anything else that is received from the hands of the government-service 
of the post, for example."159 The post office lacks the attributes of a pub-
lic good: consumption is rivalrous (if a mailperson delivers my mail, he 
cannot deliver your mail at the same time) and exclusive (you cannot get 
your letters delivered unless you pay postage). Thus, it makes sense for 
the government to run the postal service on a fee-for-service basis. Yet, 
there is no such pricing mechanism available to apportion the cost of true 
public goods. Generally, then, benefits that accrue to individual citizens 
from public programs are not amenable to exact definition. 
That being said, there are three assumptions about the allocation of 
benefits that provide baselines for determining the net burdens of a tax. 
First, assume that all governmental projects benefit each person by the same 
absolute amount. Under this assumption one can draw the net burdens 
curves for the Bill Gates tax and for a progressive income tax: 
0 
Net Benefit/ 
Burden 
159 Hackett, supra note 99, at 440. 
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In each case, the gross benefits curves shifted upward. The shift is not 
equal for all points on the curve, as it would have been if one was measur-
ing burdens/benefits in fixed dollars. Here, the curves represent percent 
burdens/benefits and, hence, a dollar's worth of benefits or burdens has a 
greater impact the further one goes to the left, as the base level of income 
is decreasing in that direction. This shift has no effect on the continuity of 
burdens between taxpayers, and accordingly, one's conclusions remain 
unchanged under the assumption of equal benefits. The small benefit of 
public programs to Bill Gates is swamped by the inordinate burden im-
posed, and, under the CBP, he still has a takings claim. Including benefits 
in the progressive tax case does not single anyone out for much worse 
treatment than their neighbor, and there remains no discontinuity that 
would evidence a taking. 
The second baseline assumption about benefits is that they increase 
proportionately with wealth; this is the assumption made by advocates of 
flat-rate taxation. The following two diagrams illustrate the net burden 
curves for the two taxes under this assumption: 
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Because these graphs add percent benefits to gross benefits as a percent-
age of income, the addition of benefits here simply lifts each curve by a 
fixed amount. With benefits increasing as income increases, the discon-
tinuous jump in the Bill Gates taxes shrinks and, under extreme assump-
tions, could disappear. In general, however, the gap between the net 
burden on Bill Gates and the person with the next highest income will be 
noticeable, as Gates alone is subject to the tax. Thus, the CBP suggests 
that even if benefits increase with wealth, a tax on the wealthiest person 
alone is still a taking. Similarly, factoring in benefits from a progressive 
income tax under this assumption does not change the key features of the 
curve. In other words, the difference in burden between any two taxpay-
ers remains relatively small; accordingly, progressive income taxation is 
not a taking under the CBP. 
The third and final distribution of benefits considered here is the 
possibility that public expenditures disproportionately benefit the 
wealthy. 
FIGURE 11 
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For the Bill Gates tax, benefits from governmental spending that increase 
disproportionately with income translate into quickly rising benefits for 
wealthier taxpayers, except for Gates. More so than in the previous examples 
(Figures 9 and 10), benefits here cut into the burden imposed on him and him 
alone. Still, unless benefits increase dramatically at higher incomes, there 
will be a noticeable gap between the burden imposed on Gates and on the 
next highest earner. Thus, even under an assumption very favorable to the 
constitutionality of the tax, its discontinuous burdens violate the CBP. 
For the progressive income tax, the curve is drawn under the assumption 
that the disproportionately increasing benefits eventually outweigh increasing 
marginal rates, which explains why the curve begins to move upward at the 
highest incomes. It seems just as likely that this net burdens curve will slope 
downward everywhere, the outcome if marginal tax rates more than offset the 
rate at which benefits increase with income. In either case, however, the ap-
plication of the CBP yields the same results as it did under the two previous 
assumptions on the distribution of benefits: there are no discontinuous jumps 
in the net benefits curve, and, hence, there is no taking. 
Under each of these assumptions about the distribution of benefits, 
then, the CBP validates the constitutionality of progressive income taxation 
and conversely suggests that the Bill Gates tax is a taking. Although these 
results might not always hold, they do seem robust to quite a wide variety 
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of assumptions about the distribution of benefits from government projects. 
This stands in stark contrast to the argument that anything but a flat-rate in-
come tax is unconstitutional, which assumes that the benefits from govern-
ment programs increase precisely in proportion with income. Given the 
impossibility of calculating how much governmental expenditures benefit 
persons across income or other independent variables, like wealth, the need 
to make such an assumption renders the case for strictly proportionate taxa-
tion brittle. The case for flat-rate taxation stands or falls with a dubious as-
sumption. The results of applying the CBP, however, are robust: they 
survive under a wide variety of assumptions about the distribution of 
benefits from governmental expenditures. 
In one sense, the Bill Gates tax can be thought of as an extreme case of 
progressive taxation. Yet, it is important to realize how such a tax, as illus-
trated above, differs radically from the structure and practice of income 
taxation in America. Income tax rules in the United States have always al-
lowed all potential taxpayers to claim exemptions. To do otherwise creates 
bizarre incentives. For example, if a 50% tax has a $100,000 exemption, 
but those making over $100,000 were not entitled to the exemption, some-
one making $100,001 would pay $50,000.50 in taxes, reducing their after-
tax income far below those making $99,000. Taxpayers would respond in a 
wide variety of ways to such a peculiar system; if nothing else, they would 
simply refuse compensation over $100,000. 160 Paying $50,000 in taxes on 
the marginal dollar of income at $100,000 is precisely the kind of discon-
tinuous jump in liability that the CBP deems a taking. 
Avoiding such an absurd tax regime, while allowing all taxpayers to 
avail themselves of exemptions, makes it extremely difficult to burden one 
person or one group heavily while leaving all others untouched. For exam-
ple, assume that Bill Gates is the only person with an income over $1 bil-
lion. The obvious way to limit the tax's application to him is to set the 
exemption level at $1 billion. Yet, this tax will only impose a discontinu-
ous burden on Gates if his income is much higher than $1 billion. If his in-
come is $1 billion and one, he would pay at most $1 more in tax than the 
next highest earner. If his income is $2 billion, he would bear a discontinu-
ous burden. Such examples demonstrate that a top marginal tax rate that 
applies to only one or a few individuals will violate the CBP if there is a 
discontinuous jump between these top incomes and those of everyone else. 
Under these assumptions, a progressive income tax with a top rate that af-
fects one or a handful of individuals does, in fact, single these individuals 
for a unique burden: they pay a tax rate on a significant portion of their 
income not felt by anyone else. 
160 This is not strictly true. Even without the exemption, those with incomes above $200,000 would be 
better off accepting the compensation. 
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A similar discontinuity occurs if the highest marginal rate applies to a hand-
ful of taxpayers in addition to Gates, but they are all clustered in the very 
low end of the tax bracket. In order to avoid such discontinuities and com-
ply with the CBP, the highest marginal tax rate must apply to a significant 
number of taxpayers, some of whose income extends past the lower bound 
of the rate, where the effective tax rate increases most rapidly. 161 
4. Applying the CBP to Other Taxes and the Draft.-The progressive 
taxation of estates and inheritances, by both state and federal government, pre-
dates enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment; moreover, the Supreme Court 
repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to these taxes} 62 The Supreme 
Court's justification for such taxes, however, is very formal, and, well, un-
American. As the Court declared in Magoun v. fl/inois Trust & Savings Bank, 
"[t]he right to take property by devise or descent is a creature of the law, and 
not a natural right-a privilege, and therefore the authority which confers it 
may impose conditions upon it."163 There is no doubt that this holding reflects 
161 Note that the federal income tax during the Civil War, despite its very high exemptions, still 
reached thousands of citizens. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86. 
162 Magoun v. Ill. Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898) (upholding progressive state inheritance 
tax); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (upholding progressive federal inheritance tax); New York 
Trust v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921) (upholding progressive federal estate tax). An inheritance tax is 
levied on recipients individually; an estate tax is levied on the decedent's property before distribution. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 550,783 (6th ed. 1990). 
163 Magoun, 170 U.S. at 288. 
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the law of England during the founding era. 164 The rule, however, is rooted in 
feudalism and the existence of a single overlord. Locke, a primary source of 
property theory for the founding generation, explicitly rejected the notion that 
inheritance existed at the pleasure of the king or queen: "Every man is born 
with ... a right, before any other man, to inherit with his brethren his father's 
goods."165 And at least one state court explicitly rejected the Supreme Court's 
reasoning in Magoun as inimical to American property ideology: 
That element of unadaptability under our conception of inherent rights in place 
of privileges by grace was hardly understood when the idea took root which ob-
tained quite generally for a century after our American system was established, 
that there is no natural right to inherit ... which this court has seen fit to reject as 
heresies, viewed from the standpoint of our conception of such rights. 166 
Thus, the Supreme Court's doctrinal justification for progressive estate 
taxes is questionable. The CBP, however, provides a much firmer defense of 
progressive estate taxation. For all but extreme cases, where the exemption 
levels are so high that they impact one or only a few taxpayers, the burdens of 
the tax are still continuous under the CBP because even those paying the tax 
get the benefit of the fairly high, but not extraordinarily high, exemption.167 
A general sales (excise) tax on all goods is the primary alternative to the 
income tax (or a wealth tax) as a practical source of revenue sufficient to meet 
the needs of the modern state. The fundamental difference between a sales tax 
and an income tax is that a sales tax reaches only consumption; it leaves sav-
ings untaxed. For the purpose of applying the CBP, however, the key point is 
that, in practice, sales taxes are almost always assessed at a single rate; ac-
cordingly, there is no possibility for a discontinuous jump in percent burdens 
on consumption. Given a flat rate, sales taxation clearly satisfies the CBP. 
One common objection to a sales tax is that it is effectively regressive in 
income: since savings, which escapes taxation, increase rapidly with income, 
the wealthy pay much less sales tax, as a proportion of income, than the poor. 
One would then expect that scholars who argue that any deviation from strictly 
proportional taxation would oppose a general sales tax, but I could not uncover 
a single article making this argument. Indeed, Epstein maintains that a general 
164 Blackstone was clear that there was no natural right to inherit under English law; it was permit-
ted at the pleasure of the sovereign: "Wills therefore and testaments, rights of inheritance and succes-
sion, are all of them creatures of the civil or municipal laws, and accordingly are in all respects regulated 
by them .... " 2 SiR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 479 (William 
Draper Lewis ed., 1900). Justice Story said the same rule held in America: "Nothing, therefore, can be 
clearer than that the rules of descent are subject to be changed by legislative authority." 3 JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 670 (1833). 
165 JOHN LoCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GoVERNMENT§ 190 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing 
Co. 1980) (1690), available at http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/academic/digitextsllocke/secondllocke2nd.txt. 
166 Owen v. Donald, !51 N.W. 331,367 (Wis. 1915). 
167 In this and the following example, one assumes equal benefits from the expenditure of the estate 
tax. As with the income tax, this assumption is not critical; our results are robust to a very wide variety of 
assumptions about the distribution of benefits from the expenditure of this general revenue tax. 
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sales tax is permissible. 168 Perhapf. Epstein's argument is that a sales tax is 
strictly proportional to its base, which is essentially purchases, as a flat-rate in-
come tax is strictly proportional to its base, which is income. This argument, 
however, admits that the strict proportionality requirement is quite manipulable 
based on the choice of a tax base. A flat-rate tax on wealth, for example, would 
likely mimic a progressive income tax. 169 Would advocates of flat-rate income 
taxation permit this end-run around their strict proportionality requirement? 
One common means of mitigating the regressivity of a general sales tax is 
to exempt ''necessities" like food and rent from the tax. The rationale behind 
such exemptions rests on the generally acknowledged fact that the poor spend a 
larger portion of their income than the wealthy on these items. Accordingly, 
exempting these items lightens the burden of taxation from the poor. An ex-
treme version of this practice is so-called luxury taxation, which is an excise tax 
levied on a relatively small set of goods, like yachts and expensive jewelry con-
sumed largely by the wealthy. Epstein argues that such luxury taxes, as well as 
all narrowly based sales taxes, impose disproportionate burdens and, hence, are 
unconstitutional. He cites two examples in support of his argument. First, in 
Rossmiller, the Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down a statute that declared 
all ice on lakes state property and that imposed an excise tax on the ice extrac-
tors. 170 The court reasoned that the statute destroyed citizens' preexisting prof-
its a prendre171 to remove ice. Epstein defends the court's holding, noting that 
the tax imposed disproportionate burdens on certain citizens, like the plaintiff 
who had made investments in ice removal before passage of the statute.172 
Second, Epstein attacked Montana's severance tax173 on coal, arguing that it 
reduces the value of Montana coal owners' property. He generalizes from such 
cases to argue that any nongeneral sales tax will impose disproportionate bur-
dens on sellers of the taxed item(s).174 
Epstein, however, makes some important exceptions to his rule requiring a 
sales tax to reach all goods. He states that the government may impose excise 
taxes on goods that have negative external effects on other property owners, 
such as nuisances, without paying compensation. In addition, he argues that 
the government may limit the use of a scarce resource by imposing a tax on an 
activity affecting the availability of the resource, like fishing for a depleted spe-
cies. These exceptions Epstein notes are in keeping with accepted doctrine 
that nuisance regulation and solutions to common pool problems are among 
168 EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 293-94. 
169 See generally Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 140. 
170 Rossmiller v. State, 89 N.W. 839 (Wis. 1902). 
171 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1211 (6th ed. 1990) (defining profit<\ prendre). 
172 EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 223-24. 
173 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981 ). Severance is just a fancy name for 
an excise tax, supposedly assessed at the instant the coal is severed from the earth by mining. 
174 EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 293-94. 
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the primary purposes of state regulation and thus not considered takings. 175 
Even acknowledging such justifications for these exceptions, there are 
some problems with Epstein's argument that specific excise taxes are takings. 
The first is the complex issue of tax incidence, namely who ultimately bears 
the burden of a levy. Just because consumers nominally pay a sales tax at the 
time of purchase does not mean that they bear the entire burden of the tax, or 
indeed any of it. Incidence is complex and depends on the shapes, and in par-
ticular the elasticities, of the demand and supply curves.176 Epstein seems to 
assume that the incidence is on the suppliers alone. If, however, the tax falls 
mainly on purchasers and the group of such purchasers form a high propor-
tion of the population in the jurisdiction, there is no disproportionate burden 
imposed on anyone, and thus no violation of the CBP. 
Another problem with Epstein's opposition to narrowly targeted sales 
taxation is that, like his opposition to progressive taxation, it is inconsistent 
with both longstanding historical practice and judicial doctrine. The founding 
generation singled out carriages, which were a luxury item, for taxation. In 
addition, the nation imposed tariffs asymmetrically throughout the 1800s, 
leaving some imports untaxed, others taxed lightly, and yet others taxed heav-
ily.177 The courts have given states broad latitude in selecting the targets of 
taxation. In Dane v. Jackson, 178 for instance, the Supreme Court held that a 
Massachusetts tax on income from intangible property was constitutional de-
spite its admitted effect of transferring tax revenue from some localities to 
others. Here, the Court clearly deferred to legislative tax base selections: 
[S]ince the system of taxation has not yet been devised which will retwn precisely 
the same measure ofbenefit to each taxpayer or class of taxpayers, in proportion to 
payment made, as will be retwned to ever; other individual or class paying a given 
tax, it is not within either the disposition or power of this court to revise the neces-
sarily complicated taxing systems of the States for the purpose of attempting to 
produce what might be thought to be a more just distribution of the burdens of 
taxation than that arrived at by the state Legislatures . .. . 179 
175 Though Epstein believes that taxation of those imposing costs on society is a not a taking, he 
would limit the application of this rule. For example, he disagrees with the holding in City of Pittsburgh 
v. ALCO Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974 ), where the Court upheld a 20% tax on private parking lots 
against a due process challenge. The Supreme Court upheld the tax based in large part on the City's jus-
tification: the tax was designed to charge suburbanites for the use of city roads. /d.; see also EPSTEIN, 
supra note 5, at 140-43. Epstein argues that the tax was seriously overinclusive, maintaining that taxes 
on those imposing costs must be narrowly tailored. Under Epstein ' s standard, it is not clear that federal 
and state gasoline taxes are legal. This is a worrisome result; although they are not perfect, gasoline 
taxes are an administratively inexpensive way to internalize the congestion, road wear, and pollution 
costs imposed by vehicles. Practically speaking, there may be no better alternative. 
176 MUSGRAVE&MUSGRAVE,supranote 158,atch.l5. 
177 See supra note 76 (discussing Carriage Tax); STANLEY, supra note 3, at 25-27 (discussing asym-
metry of tariffs). 
178 256 u.s. 589(1921). 
179 /d. at 598-99. 
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In his treatise, written during this classical period, Cooley concurred with 
the Court: "The legislature must also, except when an unbending rule has been 
prescribed for it by the constitution, have power to select in its discretion the 
subjects of taxation."18° Cooley denied that state constitutional provisions de-
creeing unifonnity in taxation limited the legislature's choice of a tax base-a 
clause facially much more on point than general takings provisions. 
As it did with income taxation, the CBP helps distinguish cases in which 
courts accepted and rejected challenges to specific excise taxes. Consider, for 
example, the Rossmiller and Dane decisions. Dane's tax on income from in-
tangibles undoubtedly impacted a broad range of the citizenry, whose intan-
gible property ranged in value from almost nothing to very large amounts. 
Accordingly, the burden curve for the tax was smooth and did not violate the 
CBP. Conversely, harvesting ice likely involved relatively few producers, so 
imposing the tax on their product, questions of incidence aside, imposed rela-
tively heavy burdens on a small group. Thus, the CBP suggests that Epstein 
was correct in adjudging the selective tax on ice removal a taking. 
As a final application of the CBP to general revenue tax, which is a tax 
that benefits most citizens, consider the military draft. Others have noted that 
the draft, in many respects, looks like a taking.181 Its net burden curve bears 
this out: 
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18° COOLEY, supra note 13, at ch. 14, at 632. 
draftees 
181 BLUM & I<ALVEN,JR., supra note 9, at 7...S; Fischel, supra note 73, at24-28. 
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Here, the curve has been drawn under the baseline assumption that all citi-
zens benefit equally from the services performed by the conscripted mili-
tary. The downward slope of the curve among draftees reflects the differing 
opportunity costs to the draftees, such as the relinquishment of private-
sector wages. The steep jump in net burden between those drafted and eve-
ryone else violates the CBP. 182 
There is little if any doubt, however, that as a matter of current law the 
draft is not a taking that requires compensation. It thus represents the first 
example of a measure that violates the CBP yet is not, and has never been, 
ruled a compensable taking. That said, recognition of the heavy burden im-
posed by the draft has led legislatures to confer special benefits on soldiers 
more than once. The post-WWII "GI" bill and veterans' hospitals are two re-
cent examples. Consider, also, Booth v. Town ofWoodbury,183 a splendid ex-
ample from the Civil War. The Town of Woodbury, relying on a state 
statute, passed an ordinance raising, by general taxation, $200 for each of the 
thirty-two soldiers that made up the town's quota under the national draft law. 
The would-be soldiers could either use the $200 to hire a replacement, or 
serve in the Union army and take the sum as a "bounty."184 Some non-draftee 
taxpayers challenged this additional tax. Counsel for the town, in response to 
this challenge, directed the court's attention to the allocation ofbenefits: 
It was for the conunon benefit of the inhabitants of Woodbury that the town 
quota should be filled, and that conunon benefit justifies a general taxation. 
The conunon welfare of the town might demand that substitutes should be 
hired for drafted men, who would serve the government equally well, and 
leave good farmers and good mechanics at their labor. The town could better 
afford to pay the money than lose the men, and the government is in either 
case equally assisted. 185 
He then contrasted this broad allocation of benefits with the draft's nar-
row burdens: 
Is it in opposition to natural right and justice that property, three quarters of 
which is probably in the hands of persons not liable to a draft, should bear its 
182 Fischel, supra note 73 (arguing that the draft is only a taking when the nation drafts a small per-
centage of its citizens). This Article will reach the same result-that burdens placed on majorities are al-
most never takings-but the reasoning here will differ. Fischel, inter alia, borrows Michelman's 
"demoralization" model, see discussion supra Part II.C, and argues that (i) marginal demoralization costs 
fall as the percent of the citizenry drafted increases and (ii) marginal settlement costs increase as the state 
must impose more and more taxes, and thus deadweight losses, to compensate the draftees. Fischel, supra 
note 73. The problem with this model is that at some point marginal settlement costs begin to fall: as the 
size of the group drafted approaches 100%, the group itself appropriates all the benefits of its efforts, and 
these implicit benefits begin to obviate the need for explicit compensation. In the limit, everyone fights to 
save the nation, and there is no point to taxing everyone just to write each a check equal to their tax bill . 
183 32Conn.118(1864). 
184 Fischel, supra note 73, at 48 (citing "filE DRAFT AND ITS ENEMIES 57-58 (John O'Sullivan & Alan 
M. Mecklereds., 1974)). 
185 Booth, 32 Conn. at 122-23. 
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fair share of the burden of the present exigency? Those over forty-five years 
of age have an equal interest in the stability of our institutions. The drafted 
man pays his share of all taxes, and in addition, whichever of the legal alterna-
tives he chooses, service, either personal, by substitute, or the commutation. Is 
it unjust that this extra burden should be assumed by all, and the entire com-
munity be permitted to pay what the great majority esteem it a privilege to 
pay? It is not taxing A to put money into the pocket of B; it is taxing ~11 to 
meet the requirements of a peremptory law. 186 
Based on these arguments, the court rejected an explicit takings challenge 
to the town ordinance, ruling that this was a tax exacting from each taxpayer 
"their share of a justly imposed and apportioned general public burthen, and the 
equivalent is presumptively received in the benefits conferred by the govem-
ment."187 In addition, the court noted that the state could impose a "serve or 
pay" obligation on all citizens, instead of just younger men, and that the mu-
nicipal tax measure imposed a lesser burden on non-draftees. 
To summarize, the CBP holds most forms of general taxation-
taxation applied to projects benefiting a broad class of the community-
immune from takings challenges. There are, as just acknowledged, a few 
exceptions to this immunity, namely the Bill Gates tax or a narrowly fo-
cused sales tax. These exceptions, however, are consistent with the current, 
and long-standing, understanding of the legislature's broad powers to 
choose a particular mode of taxation. As Cooley noted, 
No system of taxation has yet been devised which will return precisely the 
same measure of benefit to each taxpayer or class of taxpayers in proportion to 
payment made, as will be returned to every other individual or class paying a 
given tax; and it follows that neither the federal nor state courts have power to 
revise the taxing system of a state for the purpose of attempting to produce a 
more just distribution of the burdens of taxation than that arrived at by the leg-
islature. A state tax law will be held to conflict with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "only where it proposes, or clearly results in, such flagrant and palpable 
inequality between the burden imposed and the benefit received, as to amount 
to the arbitrary taking of property without compensation-'to spoliation under 
the guise of exerting the power of taxation."' 188 
One straightforward way to interpret Cooley's phrase "flagrant and 
palpable inequality between the burden imposed and the benefit re-
ceived,"189 which is the point at which the Supreme Court says that taxation 
can amount to an "arbitrary taking,"190 is as a violation of the CBP. A 
large, discontinuous jump in the net burden curve for a tax corresponds well 
with such language. 
186 /d. at 123-24. 
187 /d. at 130. 
188 COOLEY, supra note 52, at 216 (citing Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589, 599 (1921 )). 
189 See id. 
190 Dane, 256 U.S. at 599. 
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5. Applying the CBP to Zoning and Other Forms of Regulation.-
Although this Article has developed the CBP as a means to draw the line 
between taxation and takings, this subpart, and the following subpart IV.B, 
endeavor to demonstrate that the CBP operates under a general principle 
embedded in takings law. This section applies the CBP to zoning and other 
common forms of regulation; subpart IV.B fits the principle into the 
broader framework of the Supreme Court's existing takings jurisprudence. 
As an example, zoning both benefits and burdens restricted parcels. It 
benefits each owner by limiting neighbors' land use, but burdens each 
owner with roughly symmetric restrictions. Ideally, these benefits and bur-
dens would make every landoWner better off, but in practice that is rare. 
Consider, for instance, the following scenario. Greenacre, a semi-rural 
area, fifteen miles from any shopping venue, is zoned entirely single-
family, and is fully developed. Brownacre, directly across a major road 
from Greenacre, was unimproved and unzoned until new legislation limited 
it to single-family use. This zoning will sharply reduce the value of parcels 
in Brownacre that border Greenacre: the parcels' closeness to Greenacre, 
along with their close proximity to a major road, made them ideal locations 
to satisfy Greenacre' s commercial needs. The farther one travels into 
Brownacre, however, the smaller the value of such land-use opportunities. 
Indeed, at some point, one presumes the benefits of restricting neighbors 
will exceed the burdens on a particular owner. 191 
Under Euclid v. Ambler Realty, the zoning of Brownacre is undoubtedly 
constitutional. Those who believe that progressive taxation is a taking naturally 
argue that so too is such zoning. In both cases, net burdens are not strictly pro-
portional because the "reciprocal benefits" of zoning do not offset, even 
roughly, disproportionate diminutions in value imposed on those in Brownacre 
who own land across the street from Greenacre. As Epstein argues, 
unless all land in the area is subject to the restriction, there is still an enormous 
disproportionate impact. ... The restrictive rules are a government-sponsored 
restraint of trade. [I]t is immaterial that the owners "share" in the benefits of 
the [zoning ordinance]. The issue is the extent of benefits they receive. . . . A 
nickel's compensation will not discharge a hundred dollar obligation. To treat 
the mere existence of some benefits as an adequate measure of their value is to 
indulge in a conclusive presumption that is known to be wrong . ... 192 
The result under the CBP, on the other hand, dovetails with existing law 
and would hold such zoning constitutional. The burdens in Brownacre look 
almost exactly like a progressive income tax, with burdens increasing as one 
gets closer to Greenacre, where opportunities for retailing are more attractive. 
If one thinks of parcels as the base for this "zoning tax," then there are no large 
191 The Article discusses the unusual case oflaws for which burdens exceed benefits for everyone infra 
Part IV.C. 
192 EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 273. 
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jumps in the tax rate, and thus under the CBP, there is no taking. 
Although generally valid, zoning, like taxation, can cross the line, violate 
the CBP, and amount to a taking whenever it burdens certain landowners much 
more than their neighbors. So-called "reverse spot zoning," for example, 
occurs when a zoning ordinance prevents a property owner from utilizing his 
or her property in a certain way, when virtually all of the adjoining neighbors 
are not subject to such a restriction, creating, in effect, a veritable zoning is-
land or zoning peninsula in a surrounding sea of contrary zoning classification. 
Reverse spot zoning is invalid, as it is confiscatory. 193 
More generally, the Supreme Court has found zoning a taking where, even 
though contemplated for general application, the zoning applies only to one 
parcel. 194 
General economic legislation, like zoning, is presumptively valid but 
such measures may transgress the Takings Clause in extreme cases. For ex-
ample, the liability for coal miners' health costs at issue in Eastern Enter-
prises195 was such an extreme case. Although the author disagreed with the 
Court's grounds for distinguishing taxes from takings, the result in Eastern 
Enterprises is entirely consistent with the CBP. The statute struck down by 
the Court attempted to impose a significant fraction of the unexpected health 
costs of former miners on an entity with tenuous ties to the mining industry, 
in general, and the sick miners, in particular. The difference in the burden 
imposed on Eastern Enterprises and every other segment of society with simi-
larly loose ties to the miners was huge and there was no justification for this 
deviation from the CBP. The Eastern Enterprises opinion vindicated Richard 
Epstein's contention that the Black Lung Compensation Program, similar in 
many respects to the legislation struck down in Eastern Enterprises, was a 
taking. His argument was quite similar to the logic of the Eastern Enter-
prises Court: taxing new mine owners for the health expenses of miners that 
they never employed, and concentrating the burden of those expenses on a 
"narrow segment" of the population, violated the CBP. 196 
The coal industry also supplied, arguably, the most important takings case 
the Supreme Court ever decided, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 197 The 
193 City of Miami Beach v. Robbins, 702 So. 2d 1329, 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). The label "re-
verse spot zoning" was derived from the term "spot zoning," where a landowner is singled out for favorable 
treatment (as opposed to unfavorable treatment in cases of reverse spot zoning). See DANIEL R. 
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW§ 6.37 (Lexis Law Publ'g, 4th ed. 1997) (1982). 
194 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). In general, as the hypothetical with Greenacre 
and Brownacre showed, this is not so. More difficult to explain is their assertion that inflation focuses bur-
dens narrowly. !d. Under the likely assumption that there is a continuum from large-magnitude creditors, 
to those who are neither borrowers nor lenders, to large-magnitude debtors, inflation has a continuum of 
effects: from great harm to large creditors to great benefit to large debtors (the converse applies for defla-
tion). Thus, under the CBP, it is quite difficult to paint inflation or deflation as a taking. 
195 524 u.s. 498 (1998). 
196 Epstein, supra note 49, at 442. 
197 260 u.s. 393 (1922). 
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Court's holding is also consistent with the CBP. Mahon involved a Pennsyl-
vania statute barring mining companies from the removal of coal pillars that 
might cause the surface to subside, despite the fact that the mining company 
had specifically bargained for the right to cause such subsidence. 198 In an oft-
quoted passage, the Court held that the diminution in value to the mining com-
pany's property rights went "too far."199 This Article will return to the Court's 
diminution test in the next section. For present purposes, however, it is clear 
that the CBP provides an alternative ground for the finding that the Pennsyl-
vania statute effected a taking: under the plausible assumption that few own-
ers' land contained significant coal pillars, the statute simulated a narrowly 
focused excise tax, concentrating burdens on a small group. 
B. The Continuous Marginal Burdens Principle and Current 
Takings Doctrine 
Although the CBP is thus consistent with the outcome of Mahon, it is 
not consistent with its so-called diminution test, which is the idea that a 
regulation or other government act that destroys more than some percent of 
property values is a taking. As explained and illustrated above, the CBP 
calls for a relative, contextual comparison, attempting to determine if a 
plaintiffs burden significantly exceeds the imposition on the next most 
burdened person. This is in stark contrast to the absolute, context-free 
diminution test currently employed by the Supreme Court. 
Although Supreme Court takings doctrine is not entirely clear, it appears 
that the Court has refined Mahon's diminution test for regulatory takings 
cases into a three-pronged test first applied in Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York. This test considers (1) "the economic impact of the regula-
tion on the claimant," (2) "the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations," and (3) "the character of the 
government action. "200 The last prong of the test seems to refer to per se 
rules for specific types of governmental conduct, such as physical invasions, 
regulating nuisances, and destructions of all value. 
One can think of the CBP as a concrete rule to operationalize the vague 
first and second prongs of the Penn Central test, regarding "economic im-
pact" and "interference with investment-backed expectations." First, the 
CBP captures the economic impact of a regulation on property owners. 
Second, investment-backed expectations fit CBP-friendly cases like 
Rossmiller,201 in which regulation will impact a small group of property 
owners who have made investments in an activity that has been narrowly 
targeted for taxation or other forms of regulation. 
The majority opinion in Penn Central, however, indicates that the 
198 /d. at412-13 . 
199 /d. at 414-15 . 
200 438 u.s. 104, 124 (1978). 
201 89 N.W. 839 (Wise. 1902). 
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Court did not read its first two prongs in a manner consistent with the CBP. 
The opinion rejected Penn Central Railroad's takings challenge to New 
York City landmarks preservation laws, which prevented it from building a 
skyscraper on top of Grand Central Station. Under the CBP, landmarks 
preservation laws are quite likely takings. Those owning landmarks, a rela-
tively small group, bear the entire burden of satisfying a society-wide desire 
to preserve noteworthy buildings and sites. The majority admitted that the 
landmark laws reached only four hundred buildings and thirty-one small 
districts in New York.202 The dissent, however, gives a statistic much more 
relevant for applying the CBP: the regulations affected only 0.04% of 
landowners in the City.203 Ignoring the relevant tax base, Justice Brennan's 
majority opinion explicitly denied that New York's landmark preservation 
laws were "like discriminatory, or 'reverse spot' zoning .... [T]he New 
York City law embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of his-
toric or aesthetic interest wherever they might be found in the city."204 De-
spite the new three-prong veneer, the Penn Central Court seems to have 
simply applied Mahon's diminution test: the railroad suffered, but it still 
could earn a "fair return" on Grand Central Station, and hence did not suffer 
a diminution severe enough to trigger compensation. 
Similar reasoning in Andrus v. Allard2°5 led to another decision at odds 
with the CBP?s approach to the first two arms of the Penn Central test. In 
Allard, the Court held that a statute banning the sale of eagle feathers did 
not amount to a taking of the property of those owning such feathers. Al-
though the statute did destroy the right-to-alienate "stick" in the bundle of 
property rights, the Court determined that it was "crucial that appellees re-
tain the rights to possess and transport their property, and to donate or de-
vise the protected birds. "206 The Court, in all seriousness, suggested that 
eagle feather artifact owners could generate income by displaying the items 
and charging admission. It is extraordinarily doubtful that the income gen-
erated by such viewings would even approach the feathers' retail sale value. 
For example, witness the ratio of sales to display income for collectibles in 
general, such as stamps, coins, and autographs. The statute banning sales of 
eagle feathers likely does reduce illegal poaching of the endangered eagles, 
but the law imposed most of the costs of this measure on a very small group 
of dealers in eagle feather artifacts.207 
202 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 132. 
203 !d. at 138 n.l. 
204 !d. at 132. 
205 444 u.s. 51 (1979). 
206 /d. at 66. 
207 One might argue that the statute in Allard imposed a continuum of burdens, because ownership of ea-
gle feather artifacts probably form a continuum: many own none, many own a few, many own a few more 
than a few, etc., up to the largest owners. Each artifact, however, is a discrete property right, just as each parcel 
of land is a discrete unit for takings analysis. This is but another manifestation of the difficult "denominator'' 
problem of takings law discussed at supra text accompanying notes 144-45. Though the CBP does not solve 
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The third prong of Penn Central, regarding "the character of the govern-
ment action," seems to refer to three per se rules. First, the government need 
not pay compensation when regulation of a nuisance reduces a property's 
value. Property rights generally do not include the right to impose costs on 
neighbors, and the CBP has no application in such cases in which owners en-
joined from maintaining nuisances simply bear no compensable burden. 
Second, if the character of the government action involves any sort of 
physical invasion, there is a taking and the state must pay compensation.208 A 
number of commentators have attacked this rule as being excessively formal 
and as lacking any policy justification.209 It is inconsistent with the CBP, be-
cause it compensates in cases where burdens are small and continuous. The 
outcome of Loretto illustrates the futility of the rule and its disconnect with the 
Armstrong principle regarding unfair burdens. After all, the plaintiff landlords 
collected $1 in compensation for being obligated, under state law, to suffer the 
presence of cable TV wiring and switching boxes on their premises. 
Third, under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, government meas-
ures that destroy "all economically viable use" of property are takings. 210 Here, 
regulation designed to prevent beach erosion barred Lucas from building any-
thing on two beachfront parcels. The Supreme Court held that the state had to 
compensate Lucas for such a complete ban on improving his tracts. The CBP 
might concur with the outcome of the case, if not the reasoning. South Caro-
lina's scheme to prevent beach erosion may well have harmed Lucas and a 
small handful of other owners of beachfront property far more than others; if 
so, there was a taking under the CBP. Yet, as noted repeatedly above, the CBP 
requires significant empirical fmdings about the class of burdened owners. In 
general, the Lucas rule is not consistent with the CBP; it is permissible to bur-
den some owners, say 100% of the value of some parcel, if another is burdened 
by 99%, another by 98%, and so on, in small, continuous steps, all the way up 
to the parties burdened least by the regulation.211 
the denominator problem, the problem poses no greater problem for it than for other theories about defining 
takings. 
208 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
209 Frank Michelman, Takings 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1621 n.105 (1988); Douglas W. 
Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1630, 1650 (1988); Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem 
ofTakings, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 591,661 (1998). 
210 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225,260 (1980)). 
211 Justice Stevens, dissenting in Lucas, stressed that the generality of the statute-the fact that it ap-
plied to all of the numerous beachfront property owners along South Carolina's shore-weighed heavily 
against the majority's determination that a taking likely occurred. /d. at 1074. Although the concept of 
"general application" has some overlap with the CBP, Stevens focuses on geographic generality. The CBP 
focuses on generality of economic impact. Responding to Stevens's use of generality in his majority opin-
ion, Justice Scalia stated that "a regulation specifically directed to land use no more acquires immunity by 
plundering landowners generally than does a law specifically directed at religious practice acquire immu-
nity by prohibiting all religions." Id. at 1027 n.l4. Whether this statement is at odds with the CBP depends 
on the meaning of the phrase "plundering landowners generally." 
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C. Normative Foundations for the CBP 
Thus far, the discussion and defense of the CBP has been almost en-
tirely doctrinal. Specifically, the CBP has been shown to be consistent with 
the "no unfair burdens" principle from Armstrong. Moreover, the CBP 
provides a coherent guide for drawing the line between takings and taxation 
and it is consistent with much, though not all, of the existing body of tak-
ings case law. 
This subpart offers grounds for supporting the CBP as sound social 
policy. The normative case for the CBP is a political one: the CBP places a 
significant obstacle in the path of any majority block of voters attempting to 
redistribute wealth from the remaining minority by imposing an "unfair" 
portion of public burdens on them. The CBP, then, is a means to achieve 
the ends articulated in Armstrong: "[T]o bar [the] Government from forc-
ing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and jus-
tice, should be borne by the public as a whole."212 
For illustration, consider the simplest example of unfair burdens in 
public measures: naked redistribution from a minority to a majority that di-
vides society into two markedly divergent camps. Here is a generic net 
burden curve for such a maneuver: 
FIGURE 15 
Net Burdens, 
Purely Redistrlbutionary Measure 
Net Benefit! 
Burden 
g 
A 
0 
212 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960). 
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Pure redistribution adds a significant structural constraint on the net 
burden curve. If one plotted absolute dollar benefits and burdens, area 
A would equal the dollar amount paid to winners and area B would 
equal the dollar amount paid by losers. 213 Because net burden curves 
show percents instead of absolute dollar amounts, the relationship is not 
quite so simple and it will depend on the distribution of income, wealth, 
or whatever comprises the tax base. Still, there will be a fixed mathe-
matical relationship between the winners (area A) and the losers (area 
B). If one thinks of a redistributive income tax, with grants to the less 
wealthy (individuals A in group A) of g% of income, and a flat tax oft% 
on a wealthy minority (individuals B in group B), then the following ac-
counting identity must hold: 
_Lg * Income(a) = ~)*Income( b) 
aeA beB 
Put into words, this equation states that the sum of cash payments to 
winners must equal the sum of taxes levied on the losers. The important 
point is that, although the areas A and B are not equal, there is a fixed 
relationship between them determined by the distribution of income or 
other tax base, along with the grant and tax rates. This zero-sum nature 
of redistribution, as will be demonstrated, makes it difficult for stark 
"us-them" redistributive laws to satisfy the CBP.214 
The example graphed above obviously violates the CBP. However, 
to come into compliance with the CBP given the budget constraint, 
while still channeling some wealth from the minority, the majority can 
(i) reduce the size of their coalition and (ii) make both benefits and bur-
dens vary somewhat with the tax base. Adopting moderate versions of 
both of these measures yields a net burden curve that looks something 
like the Figure 16 on the next page. The curve in Figure 16 still violates 
the CBP. Although shrinking the majority coalition and gradating bene-
fits and burdens reduces the "jump" between the last member of the ma-
jority and the first member of the minority, a noticeable discontinuity 
remains. 
213 To the extent that redistribution involves administrative and transactions costs, it is a negative sum 
game. This will make it even more difficult than suggested by these examples to assemble a coalition to 
implement redistribution . 
214 For an interesting discussion of the relationship between us/them, majority/minority dichotomies 
and payment of compensation, see Carol M. Rose, Property & Expropriation: Themes and Variations in 
American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REv. I. 
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Net Benefit/ 
Burden 
0 
FIGURE 16 
Net Burdens, 
Modified Redistributionary Measure 
A 
! 
B 
If the majority continues with both tactics, namely decreasing the size 
of the majority that is redistributing wealth from the minority and making 
gradations in benefits and burdens, it will end up with a perfectly straight 
line, without any ')umps," that satisfies the CBP. 
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In political terms, however, it will be difficult to muster a vote for such 
a tax proposal because the measure no longer enjoys majority support. In 
other words, the size of the benefiting coalition shrinks so much that the 
median voter no longer reaps any benefits and has little reason to support 
the measure. This series of examples, therefore, demonstrates that the CBP 
places pressure on redistributionary coalitions to shrink their size and to tier 
benefits and burdens.215 
The CBP, however, does not make redistribution entirely illegal; for 
instance, the example in Figure 17 and the progressive taxation exam-
ples discussed above may be redistributionary, depending on the as-
sumptions made about how the benefits of government increase with 
income/wealth. The CBP does, nonetheless, place significant limits on 
any majority coalition's ability to redistribute. Since redistribution 
likely has some undesirable effects, such as reducing incentives for pro-
ductive behavior and encouraging socially wasteful rent-seeking (e.g., 
resources spent on forming and maintaining a coalition to enact the 
measure), the CBP is normatively desirable for efficiency reasons. Un-
doubtedly, the appeal of this partial curb on redistribution as a matter of 
social justice is controversial, given divergent notions about inequality, 
fairness, and justice.216 
It is, in fact, possible for a willing majority coalition to redistribute 
wealth to the minority. Many current social programs do precisely this. 
Moreover, the courts have long deemed permissible such redistribution, 
at least for some purposes. "[G]ifts to unfortunate classes of society, as 
the indigent blind, the deaf and dumb, or insane, or grants to particular 
colleges or schools, or grants of pensions, swords or other mementoes 
for past services, involving the general good indirectly and in slight de-
gree, are frequently made and never questioned."217 Thus, there is no 
general constitutional barrier to legal measures that redistribute income 
via taxes, expenditures, and transfer payments. 
215 Some taxes may mix redistribution with other motivations. Tariffs, discussed in more detail at infra 
Part VI, were the primary source of national government revenue until the I 900s and so might be classified 
as a general revenue tax. Yet they had another purpose: protecting domestic enterprise from foreign com-
petition. Foreign competition is not a nuisance. It is possible, however, that protecting domestic industries 
is a privileged legislative purpose. If so, the courts should not review tariffs under the Takings Clause. On 
the other hand, tariffs often impose severe burdens on a relatively small group of citizens (e.g., domestic 
importers) to achieve a public "good" (e.g., fostering homegrown industry) which may justify Takings 
Clause review. This is simply another difficult issue in drawing the line between legitimate exercises of the 
states' police power requiring no compensation and government measures that go too far and amount to a 
taking. 
216 The leading modem defense of redistribution is JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 
1999); the most thorough reply to Rawls is ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
217 Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118, 130 (1864). 
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The resulting net burden curve for such redistributions may have two 
sorts of discontinuities. First, there may be a jump between the least-
benefited minority member and the least-burdened majority member. 
Ner Benefirl 
Burden 
0 
FIGURE 18 
Net Burdens, 
Redistribution to Minority, 
Jump: Benefits to Burdens 
Although such a redistribution measure facially violates the CBP, nor-
matively it is not troubling because it is self-imposed: the majority has 
agreed to redistribute some of its wealth to the minority. The solution 
for unhappy members of the majority is not constitutional; it is political. 
They merely have to convince their too-generous cohorts in the wealth-
ier group B to reverse the charitable policy. This solution, however, 
may not always work because other members of the majority may feel 
charitable toward the minority and, in effect, form a coalition with the 
minority to their own pecuniary detriment. 
What the CBP does forbid is targeting a subset of the majority for a 
distinctly heightened burden. Figure 19 depicts a social subsidy pro-
gram for a minority that its beneficiaries and a portion of the majority 
support, thus imposing the costs of the program on other nonbeneficiar-
ies. Those in the majority supporting the program bear a modest burden, 
while placing most of the burden on others. This differs little in sub-
stance from simple redistribution, and the CBP's limit on such legisla-
tion, as discussed above, is desirable for efficiency reasons. 
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FIGURE 19 
Net Burdens, 
Redistribution to Minority, 
Jump: Among Burdened 
The limiting cases of social programs that benefit only a minority are 
measures that burden everyone. Under a popularly elected government, one 
suspects that there must be some unaccounted-for benefit to explain such 
cases. That said, as a matter of policy, such cases are analogous to the 
situation illustrated in Figures 18 and 19. If there is a discontinuous jump 
in net burdens, then the allocation of burdens is unconstitutional. As long 
as there is no discontinuous jump in the net burdens curve, the measure is 
not a taking under the CBP. Again, the solution is political because a ma-
jority that finds the burden heavy enough can elect a government that will 
reverse course.218 
218 Examples of legislation by popularly elected officials that harm all citizens obviously are rare. In 
Owen v. Donald, 151 N.W. 331 (Wis. 1915}, the court thought it faced such a case, but failed to realize that 
the solution to such a problem is political. In Owen, the court held unconstitutional a tax to establish forest 
reserves that would benefit future generations. Although the opinion is difficult to decipher, the grounds for 
striking the statute appear to have been special provisions in the Wisconsin Constitution on budgeting and 
public improvements. The court went on, however, to suggest that the statute was a taking of property from 
the living for the benefit of future generations: 
But how to square them [the takings clause] with the imposition of large public burdens upon the 
people of the present without any hope of return to them ... burdens imposed with the avowed 
purpose of accumulating benefits for generations yet unborn, is somewhat puzzling. The mind 
naturally reaches out to grasp some sort of present equivalent moving to the tax payer for the 
property taken from him, and, seemingly, closes upon a shadow. There must be some present 
benefit. It is not sufficient that the forced contribution will be a boon to some future generation. 
The state has no right to take the property of individuals presently and afford them no possible re-
turn, merely because the storehouse, being filled, will be opened some time, depending upon 
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Now drop the assumption that the social measure under consideration 
simply redistributes wealth. In most cases, one would hope, governmental 
actions produce social gains so that the benefits (region A in the figures 
above) will exceed the burden (region B). The Court has never interpreted 
the Takings Clause to require even rough equality or fairness in the distri-
bution of gains from public projects. The CBP, which is limited to sharp 
jumps in burdens, does not rule out any distribution that burdens no one. 
As long as the line in the net burdens curve never dips below the horizontal 
axis, there cannot be a takings claim. 
V. FEES, SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS, AND SPECIFIC TAXES 
The redistributive legislation just analyzed differs from many statutes 
because, in addition to being able to determine burdens, which one assumes 
are always identifiable, one could discern the benefits of such legislation 
with relative precision. This usually is not possible for the general revenue 
taxes discussed so far because governments use income, estate, sales, and 
most other tax revenues to fund a broad range of services and goods. Sim-
ply put, the benefits cannot be pinpointed in many situations. 
For some government taxes, along with special assessments and user 
fees, however, one can identify beneficiaries and the size of their gains easily. 
It is especially easy in regard to governmental fees for the use of a park, for a 
driver's license and plates, or for public garbage collection. In such cases, the 
main beneficiary is the fee payer.219 Special assessments are one step re-
moved from fees. They provide a mechanism to compel all members of a 
group benefited by some project, most typically a road, to pay some "fair 
share" of the project's cost, like a share based on each owner's frontage. As 
with the simple user fee, the class of beneficiaries is easily identifiable when 
it comes to special assessments. Compulsion is necessary to avoid free-
riding.220 In addition to fees and assessments, this Part considers what will be 
called "specific" taxes, meaning those taxes levied to provide a specific bene-
fit to identifiable beneficiaries. Redistributionary taxation is one example of 
such "specific" taxation and property taxation to fund schools is another. 
The basic question, however, remains unchanged: how does one draw 
the line between acceptable fees, special assessments, and specific taxes on 
the one hand, and unacceptable variations that concentrate net burdens too 
narrowly and, thus, amount to a taking? Again, what distinguishes fees, as-
sessments, and specific taxes from general revenue taxes is the ability to 
Providence and the majority as to when, for the enrichment or comfort of the people then in being 
in which the tax payer had no special interest which reasonably demands any such sacrifice. 
/d. at 366. This strange rule would make even the most popular environmental measures (i.e., ensuring fu-
ture generations of clean air and clean water) unconstitutional. The court failed to understand that the Tak-
ings Clause does not constrain self-imposed burdens. 
219 To the extent the "fee" exceeds the government's cost of delivering the service or good, it includes an 
implicit tax; presumably, it is used as general revenue and subject to review under the Takings Clause. 
220 See ROBERT COOTER& lliOMAS ULEN, LAW &ECONOMICS 42 (3d ed. 2000). 
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factor the benefits of the government's expenditures into net burden curves. 
As Fried has noted, "[i]t is operationally incoherent to isolate the tax side of 
fiscal affairs ... for the simple reason that we can undo any tax distribution 
on the transfer side."221 Accounting for benefits as well as burdens is noth-
ing new for takings law; courts have long weighed "reciprocal benefits," as 
well as implicit or in-kind compensation, in deciding whether or not an 
owner has suffered a taking. 222 
Epstein, applying his strict disproportionate burden standard, generally 
approves of special assessments because the law governing them requires 
some proportionality between the benefit conferred and the assessment im-
posed.223 Yet, the case law's proportionality requirement is extremely 
loose, which gives the state wide leeway in setting the assessments due 
from individual property owners. In the early case of Griffin v. Mayor of 
Brooklyn,224 for instance, the plaintiff landowner argued that since regrad-
ing a road would benefit some who owned no land along the route, the state 
was obligated to pay for the project with proceeds from a general tax. The 
court, in rejecting this contention, declared that by matching benefits and 
burdens more closely than a general tax, special assessments were not just 
legal, but positively desirable.225 Assessments, the court stated, "shift the 
burthen of this taxation upon that part, or class ... whose lands were bene-
fited by the work, and impose[ d] it on them in proportion to the benefit they 
respectively received therefrom. "226 The court held that the assessment 
"was obviously made for the purpose of avoiding the injustice of general 
taxation for a special local project," and that it exacted "no more than his 
just share" from any landowner.227 
The Griffin court also went on to note the fundamental similarity be-
tween assessments and user fees: 
The same principle of apportionment has been applied to bridges and turnpike roads. 
The money paid for their construction and maintenance is reimbursed by means of 
tolls. Tolls are delegated taxation; and this taxation is charged and apportioned upon 
those only who derive a benefit from the original expenditure, and in proportion to that 
benefit. General taxation upon a town or county for the building of a bridge is valid 
and lawful, but obviously unjust; because it compels one to pay for the benefit of an-
other. Tolls are more equitable, because they equalize the burthen with the benefit. 228 
221 Fried, supra note 113, at 182. 
222 Jd. 
223 EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 286--89. He does note that if the state funds some type of project by spe-
cial assessment, it must do so for all such projects, otherwise those localities assessed will disproportion-
ately fund that type of improvement. Id. at 289-90. 
224 4N.Y.419(1851). 
225 Jd. at 425. 
226 Jd. 
227 Jd. 
228 Jd. at 431. 
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Based on this similarity, the court indicated that holding special assess-
ments invalid would also require holding tolls and other user fees invalid. 
The court deemed this result absurd, as "[t]he difference is only in the mode 
in which each tax-payer's share of the burthen is ascertained."229 
The Supreme Court articulated a similar standard in Houck v. Little 
River Drainage District: 
[W]ith respect to [special assessment] districts thus formed, whether by the 
legislature directly or in an appropriate proceeding under its authority, the leg-
islature may itself fix the basis of taxation or assessment, that is, it may define 
the apportionment of the burden, and its action cannot be assailed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment unless it is palpably arbitrary and a plain 
abuse. . . . Unless the exaction is a flagrant abuse, and by reason of its arbi-
trary character is mere confiscation of particular property, it cannot be main-
tained that the state has exceeded its taxing power. 230 
Another court voiced a similarly adaptive standard: 
The burdens of the state never have been, and never can be, distributed with 
absolute equality and fairness among the citizens thereof. Some taxes will 
bear a very unjust relation to the benefits received, while others will bear a 
very fair relation thereto; but this is doubtless owing in a large degree to the 
necessary imperfections incident to every system of taxation which has yet 
been devised, and all that can be reasonably expected is that the greatest good 
of the greatest number will be secured by the system adopted; or, in other 
words, that the system shall be as fair and equitable as it can reasonably be 
made.231 
The general rule, then, is that even a slight, tenuous correlation be-
tween the amount paid in taxes or assessments on the one hand, and the 
benefits received on the other hand, is sufficient to shield a measure from a 
takings challenge. Under this standard, unsurprisingly, courts generally up-
hold special assessments, though a few courts have seemed to require a 
229 Jd. The Court's economics appear dated, as the decision predates the study of public goods for 
which there is no natural (market) measure of costs or benefits. Tolls make sense as a price for (rivalrous) 
congested roads, but not for uncongested roads. Thus, although use of public goods is correlated with bene-
fits, the relationship is far from exact. In its defense, the Court was weighing fairness, not efficiency. 
In the case of special assessments for projects that increase the value of neighboring property, however, 
one may be able to measure the benefit to landowners, because it will be capitalized into the price of the 
parcels. Admittedly, this effect will not always be measurable. 
230 239 U.S. 254,262,265 (1915) (citations omitted). This deference to the calculation of special as-
sessments originated in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430 (1905), 
where Justice Holmes approved of assessments that are "generally fair" and that do "as nearly equal justice 
as can be expected." /d. at 434. "[I]f a particular case of hardship arises, that hardship must be borne as 
one of the imperfections of human things." /d. This case reversed a brief deviation into closer scrutiny of 
special assessments under Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898). See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. 
BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 744 (2d. ed. 2000). 
231 Woodv.Quimby,40A.161,165(R.I.l898). 
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somewhat closer matching of benefits with the burden of payment.232 
Courts are particularly likely to invalidate special assessments found to con-
fer no benefit on a property owner billed for some portion of an improve-
ment.233 
The weight of classical authority endorsed a similarly flexible standard 
for specific taxation. Cooley argued: 
There is no imperative requirement that taxation shall be equal. If there was, 
the operations of government must come to a stop, from the absolute impossi-
bility of fulfilling it. The most casual attention to the nature and operation of 
taxes will put this beyond question. No single tax can be apportioned so as to 
be exactly just, and any combination of taxes is likely in individual cases to in-
crease instead of diminishing the inequality. 234 
The Wood court listed common taxes for which benefits and burdens 
matched up poorly or not at al1.235 Courts also have noted that school taxes 
are due whether or not a taxpayer has children.236 Likewise, police and fire 
taxes have been levied, legally, on those owning no property in a jurisdic-
tion.237 Summarizing the principles underlying such cases, Cooley declared: 
it is almost unanimously held that it is no defense to the collection of a tax for 
a special purpose that a person liable for the tax is not benefited by the expen-
diture of the proceeds of the tax or not as much benefited as others. For in-
stance, every citizen is bound to pay his proportion of a school tax although he 
has no children, or is not a resident, and this also applies to corporations; of a 
police or fire tax, although he has no buildings or personal property; or of a 
road tax although he never used the road.238 
The Supreme Court has concurred with the thrust of such court deci-
232 See, e.g., McNally v. Township of Teaneck, 379 A.2d 446 (N.J. 1977); Fluckey v. City of Ply-
mouth, 100 N.W.2d 486 (Mich. 1960). 
233 Palmer Township Mun. Sewer Auth. v. Witty, 388 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1978) (invalidating assessing on 
an owner for two sewer lines). 
234 COOLEY, supra note 13, at 164. 
235 The court stated : 
(I]nstances are numerous in which the individual taxpayer receives and can receive no direct bene-
fit from the public improvement or institution to be paid for and supported by the tax, and yet he is 
called upon, and undoubtedly legally called upon, to conbibute towards the expense of erecting 
and maintaining the same. 
Wood, 40 A. at 164. 
236 See Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118,124 (1864) ("[A] person having no children pays an annual 
school tax to help educate the children of parents of abundant means."); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. 
Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194,203 (1905) ("Every citizen is bound to pay his proportion of a school tax, though 
he have no children ."); Wood, 40 A. at 164 ("A tax for the support of public schools is one from which only 
a part of the taxpayers receive any direct benefit ... [because] only a part thereof have children to be edu-
cated therein, and some of those who have children prefer to educate them in private schools."). 
237 Union Refrigerator, 199 U.S. at 203; Wood, 40 A. 161 (upholding special assessment for fire-
fighting improvements on an owner whose property lied about a half mile from the nearest proposed hy-
drant). 
238 COOLEY, supra note 52, at 214. 
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sions, noting that "there are doubtless many individual cases where the 
weight of a tax falls unequally upon the owners of the property taxed. This 
is almost unavoidable under every system of direct taxation. But the tax is 
not rendered illegal by such discrimination."239 
Thus, it is commonly understood that the state has broad leeway in 
making assessments and levying taxes. Moreover, there is a strong policy 
reason for this loose standard. Generally, it is efficient to make it relatively 
easy for the government to use special assessments or specific taxes to fund 
projects for identifiable groups of beneficiaries. Even a rough correspon-
dence between burdens and benefits will reduce waste and if the program 
confers few benefits, those paying for it will usually kill it. If courts re-
quired strict correspondence between assessments or specific taxes and 
benefits, governments would have incentives to avoid litigation by simply 
funding everything out of general revenue taxes. 
The CBP implements the minimal requirement that only a loose corre-
spondence need exist between benefit and burdens in special assessments 
and specific taxes. To illustrate this point, one only has to apply the CBP to 
the ubiquitous use of a real property tax to fund local public schools. For 
parents of a dozen school-age children owning or renting a low-value prop-
erty, the benefits of the tax far exceed the costs. For a childless individual 
owning a high-value property, the reverse is true. Between these two ex-
tremes there will be a range of cases. In the end, however, the net burden 
curve for this tax almost assuredly will be free of any large jumps. Thus, 
under the CBP, a property tax used to fund local schools, a tax that is al-
ready omnipresent in America, is not a taking. Under a similar argument, 
special assessments for roads, irrigation districts, and other projects also 
pass muster under the CBP .240 
At some point, however, courts have indicated that the state can go too 
far. The language from the special assessment cases is especially vivid in 
this regard, albeit not very helpful. In Houck, for instance, the Supreme 
Court declared an assessment valid "unless it is palpably arbitrary and a 
plain abuse. Unless the exaction is a flagrant abuse, and by reason of its ar-
bitrary character is mere confiscation of particular property, it cannot be 
maintained that the state has exceeded its taxing power."241 The CBP, on 
the other hand, offers a natural and more precise way to define tax burdens 
that are "palpably [or flagrantly] arbitrary," "plain abuse," or that amount to 
"a mere confiscation of particular property." It is those taxes that impose an 
239 Union Refrigerator, 199 U.S. at 203. 
240 Brauneis notes that "in the paradigm case of taxation revenue raising is separate from appropria-
tions-that is, the tax is not earmarked in advance." Robert Brauneis, Eastern Enterprises, Phillips, Money, 
and the Limited Role of the Just Compensation Clause in Protecting Property "In Its Larger and Juster 
Meaning ", 51 ALA. L. REv. 937,946 (2000). This does not hold for, inter alia, local property taxes "ear-
marked" for education. 
241 Houck v. Little River Dist., 239 U.S. 254, 262 (1915). 
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assessment or tax rate that is distinctly more burdensome on one or a few 
individuals than it is on all others, with no corresponding and roughly off-
setting benefit conferred. 
VI. PACKAGING AND LOGROLLING 
Even under the comparatively small state and national governments of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, citizens paid a variety of general 
and specific taxes, assessments, and fees. In return, they received diverse 
benefits, directly or indirectly. The number and complexity of both taxes 
and benefit programs, however, increased dramatically over the last one 
hundred years. The existence of these numerous, and potentially offsetting, 
legal regimes raises fundamental and difficult questions: when deciding 
whether a citizen has suffered a compensable taking, does one focus on 
each statutory, regulatory, or administrative measure separately? Or does 
one go to the other extreme and weigh the combined, net effect of all meas-
ures on each individual's welfare? Or, finally, does one look at some in-
termediate "package" of measures that are closely related based on some 
relevant criteria? 
Traditionally, takings law has focused narrowly on single, discrete is-
sues. Thus, when taking a parcel of land, the state may reduce compensa-
tion based on offsetting benefits directly tied to the reason for the taking 
(e.g., the new highway will raise the value of an adjacent parcel owned by 
the same person), but it may not cite benefits that the landowner reaps from 
other governmental programs (e.g., the state cannot cite the benefits Bill 
Gates derives from the copyright and patent laws to reduce the compensa-
tion due for taking a parcel of land he owns). 
In theory it may seem that there is no reason not to throw all benefits and 
burdens into one grand equation and require payment of compensation only 
to those, after accounting for all benefits and burdens, subject to noticeably 
larger net burdens under the CBP. Indeed, experience suggests that many 
seemingly unrelated legal measures are the product of political horse-trading. 
History provides examples of taxes passed in large part to offset perceived 
unfairness in existing exactions.242 More generally, different interest groups 
may engage in "logrolling," which creates two laws that, taken alone, appor-
tion burdens asymmetrically, but when taken together, satisfy the CBP. After 
discussing theory and history, however, this Part concludes that, in practical 
terms, permitting the government to dilute or reject just compensation claims 
by citing other governmental programs, which provide offsetting benefits, 
would effectively erase the compensation requirement. 
242 For example, one of the main arguments for a progressive federal income tax was that existing tar-
iffs imposed disproportionate burdens on lower income taxpayers. See infra text accompanying notes 244-
49. Similarly, a major motivation for state taxes on personalty was the perception that land taxes unfairly 
burdened those with relatively little wealth. See infra text accompanying notes 250-52. 
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In the abstract, efficient tax theory suggests that the government assess 
levies so as to minimize the deadweight loss caused when taxation alters 
consumers' decisions.243 If put into practice, this theory might impose a 
large number of narrowly focused taxes on goods without substitutes, such 
as the insulin diabetics need. Each such tax, standing alone, imposes 
asymmetric, discontinuous burdens in violation of the CBP. Yet, ex ante, 
even risk-averse citizens might support this efficient tax regime if (i) the re-
duction in deadweight loss was significant and (ii) the number and variety 
of taxes was high enough that, after accounting for all of them, few or no 
citizens were singled out for discontinuously large burdens. 
The disconnect between efficient taxation and taxation in practice is so 
great, however, that it moots the possibility discussed in the previous para-
graph. Logrolling, therefore, has been common in both federal and state 
fiscal policy. This Part will briefly examine two sets of paired taxes from 
the nineteenth century: tariffs and the income tax at the national level, and 
real and personal property taxes at the state level. An 1870s advocate of re-
instituting the national income tax nutshelled the regressive nature of tradi-
tional taxation in America at both levels: "[I]n the context of federal and 
state taxation, the poor and middle classes already paid the most due to the 
regressive aspects of the tariff and the heavy burden of land taxes."244 In 
fact, advocates of the income tax and taxes on personalty relied, in large 
part, on the unfairness of tariffs and real property taxes to sell the new taxes 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
Stanley argues that "the income tax originated as an apology for the 
aggressive manipulation of other forms of taxation, especially the tariff, 
during the Civil War. It was maintained as a shield against attack upon the 
expanding system of protection, whose regressive implications troubled 
even its authors."245 Prominent politicians repeatedly highlighted the re-
gressive nature of America's tariffs, which fell "entirely on consumption," 
and a tax on consumption "is a tax upon the poor."246 The tone was caustic: 
We tax [via tariffs] the tea, the coffee, the sugar, the spices the poor man uses. 
We tax every little thing that is imported from abroad, together with the whis-
key that makes him drunk and the beer that cheers him and the tobacco that 
consoles him. . . . [Y]et we are afraid to touch the income of Mr. As-
tor. . . . [T]he income tax is the only one that tends to equalize these burdens 
between the rich and the poor.247 
Motivated by such views, the federal government's first income taxes, 
243 MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 158. 
244 STANLEY, supra note 3, at65 (paraphrasing Rep. Burchard). 
245 !d. at 13. 
246 !d. at 18 (quoting Sen. Sherman). 
247 /d. at 19. Similarly, Senator Trumbull argued ''that a flat rate of taxation on sugar meant that the 
poor man paid a much greater proportion of his income in the price than did his wealthy counterpart, and 
that 'that is not equal ... it is not according to the property of the individual."' !d. at 34. 
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imposed during the Civil War, had high exemptions and thus impacted only 
the relatively wealthy. Yet, after the War, Charles and Mary Beard sar-
donically note that "the beneficent government ... crowned its generosity 
to capitalists by abolishing the moderate tax on incomes and shifting the en-
tire fiscal burden on goods consumed by the masses. "248 Populists, in fits 
and starts, pushed for reinstitution of a progressive income tax as a coun-
terweight to the ever-present high tariffs on necessities. William Jennings 
Bryan argued that it "was fair that the main burden of the income tax fell on 
the wealthy, since the tariff, twenty times greater, fell disproportionately on 
the working man."249 Populist efforts finally bore fruit with the passage of 
the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913. 
A parallel political struggle over taxation occurred at the state level 
during the same period. Exclusive reliance on real property taxes became 
increasingly regressive as people held greater proportion of wealth in the 
forms of untaxed or ineffectively taxed personalty, such as stocks, bonds, 
and other securities; capital assets; patents and copyrights.250 Judge Cooley, 
no radical, argued that "state tax systems ... were in practice unequal and 
oppressive because of the prevalence of undervaluation and the failure suc-
cessfully to tax personalty."25 I Subsequent empirical work has proven Coo-
ley's assessment accurate: "Some 72 percent of state revenues came from 
general property taxation as late as 1890, and contemporaries were unani-
mous in their observation that these taxes failed to reach personal property, 
and generally underassessed it when it was included in the laws."252 The 
government resolved this inequity only when it defined income to encom-
pass the income from personalty. 
Thus, advocates justified the national and state income taxes, in part, as 
remedial measures, designed to address regressive burdens imposed by pre-
existing levies. Opponents of these fiscal innovations realized that one way 
to challenge the new taxes was to limit discussion to the new tax in isola-
tion, not as part of a larger context. Accordingly, Stanley has framed the 
debate over the first income tax as follows: "[S]upporters [of the Civil War 
era income tax] tended to portray the tax as a balance wheel in the context 
of a predominantly regressive system, while opponents located inequities in 
the income tax law itself."253 
Thus, advocates have long understood that a key issue in debating a tax 
lies in packaging--determining what levies and outlays should be grouped 
248 !d. at 4 (quoting 2 CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 
99,105-15 (1949)). 
249 WITTE, supra note 89, at 72. 
250 Note that all save the homeless pay real property taxes: owners pay directly, while renters pay indi-
rectly through their landlords. 
251 STANLEY, supra note 3, at 83 (quotation omitted). 
252 ld. at 81. 
253 /d. at 34. 
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together for purposes of analyzing the distribution of burdens and benefits. 
The possibilities of packaging are literally endless. However, two examples 
illustrate the wide scope of packaging arguments possible. 
First, there are any number of plausible packaging stories that might be 
used to justify progressive taxation. This Article has discussed two already: 
the possibility that many publicly provided goods benefit the wealthy dis-
proportionately (packaging benefits from outlays with the progressive in-
come tax) and the use of a progressive income tax as a counterweight to 
regressive tariffs (packaging the two taxes together). 
Second, consider the example cited by Epstein: depression-era legisla-
tion that retroactively gave debtors greater rights in foreclosure. The Su-
preme Court held that such legislation worked a taking and Epstein 
concurs.254 He argues that such legislation singles out one group, mortgage 
lenders, for a material burden, and thus the legislation does seem to violate 
the CBP. Although the burden will vary continuously, from mortgagees 
with small loans to those with large loans, the effective rate ofthis burden is 
similar for all lenders and zero for all others, except debtors, for whom the 
legislation bestows a benefit at a rate symmetric with the burden on lenders. 
Those that wished to provide depression-era debtors with some relief 
could have argued that such measures should have been packaged with the 
macroeconomic policy of deflation. Federal monetary policy allowed 
prices to fall, yielding a benefit to creditors and a burden to debtors. Con-
sidered in tandem with deflation, reforming foreclosure to aid debtors ar-
guably restored some balance to a set of policies that otherwise unfairly 
favored creditors. 
The bottom line of this section is that if we permit the government to 
defeat taking claims by such packaging arguments, the just compensation 
requirement must disappear. If the government may cite monetary policy, it 
can cite fiscal policy, government contracts, the building of roads, Social 
Security, or any of the thousands of other government programs in the next 
case. There is no limiting principle for courts to apply in deciding what is 
the proper package in deciding takings claims. 
254 EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 438 n.l2 (citing, inter alia, Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 
295 U.S. 555 (1935) (striking down federal bankruptcy statute granting mortgagors, inter alia, five-year 
term of possession after default before foreclosure)). Radford's current status is unclear. A recent bank-
ruptcy decision,/n re Yi, 219 B.R. 394 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998), stated that it "has been all but overruled by 
Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank," id. at 401 (citing Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain 
Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937)), but Shepards and a close examination suggest that Vinton Branch dis-
tinguished Radford. The same bankruptcy opinion also said that Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 401 
n.52 (1943), declared that Vinton Branch corrected the "error" of Radford, and the cited footnote does sug-
gest strongly that the Court saw Vinton Branch as correcting "error" in Radford. In re Yi, 219 B.R. at 40 I. 
Only three years ago, however, Eastern Enterprises cited Radford with approval. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 
U.S. 498, 534 (1998). One leading constitutional law treatise does not cite either Vinton Branch or Grif-
fiths. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1986) (topic not discussed in por-
tions of the 3d ed. presently available). Another cites Vinton Branch and says that it "modified" Radford. 
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.9 (6th ed. 2000). 
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Even if one could decide how to define the relevant package of meas-
ures, the CBP highlights further difficulties. In order to satisfy the CBP, the 
combined percent burdens must offset each other so that there are no dis-
continuities. Since the base, which measures burdens or benefits, differs, 
we cannot compare rates directly. Instead, we need to filter one measure to 
make it comparable with the other. Moreover, different programs generally 
line up taxpayers in radically different net burden orders, making it gener-
ally impossible to calculate the net impact of the measures when stuck to-
gether as a package. 
Thus, takings laws' traditional refusal to consider additional burdens or 
offsetting benefits, or at least those not closely tied to a given measure, 
seems justified, as there is no way for courts to conduct such an inquiry. In 
the abstract, there is no reason not to weigh all benefits and burdens; in 
practice, however, this is impossible. Administrative measures, regulations, 
taxes, and other potential takings must stand or fall on their own. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The progressive income tax, standing alone, is not a taking under the 
CBP developed in this Article. Given the use of marginal rates that apply to 
ranges of income, the percent burdens imposed on taxpayers is assuredly 
continuous. This doctrinal principle, combined with the historical record 
and the plain language of the relevant constitutional clauses, makes a virtu-
ally unassailable case for the constitutionality of progressive taxation. 
Conversely, the Bill Gates Tax and other levies of its ilk impose starkly 
different percent burdens on only a few taxpayers, as compared with the 
next-most-burdened taxpayers. Thus, such taxes violate the CBP. The 
CBP, then, achieves the doctrinal challenge described in the introduction: it 
provides a standard that justifies progressive taxation in general, yet does 
not justify extreme cases like the Gates Tax. The CBP focuses on substan-
tive burdens and when possible, benefits, a focus that is altogether at odds 
with the Supreme Court's highly formal "specific asset" grounds for distin-
guishing taxes and takings in Eastern Enterprises. 
There is no reason to limit application of the CBP to the possibility that 
taxes are takings. The CBP also offers a concrete and workable definition 
of what it means to be singled out for an unfair portion of public burdens. 
In fact, the CBP dovetails well with most Supreme Court takings cases and 
probatively suggests why other cases are troublesome, like the landmark 
designation of Grand Central Station in Penn Central and the complete ban 
on sales of eagle feathers in Allard. Thus, the CBP can serve both as a tool 
to organize and clarify our understanding of takings law and as an aid to 
avoid such missteps in the future. 
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